{ "metadata": { "analysis_of_arguments": "Counsel for the appellant maintains that the evidence does not conclusively establish his guilt and that he was effectively unrepresented at critical stages, preventing meaningful cross-examination. The appellant emphasizes that a lack of legal assistance at trial infringed upon the right to a fair hearing. The prosecution contends that counsel was appointed for the appellant and adequate opportunities were given for defense. It further argues that the State fulfilled its obligation to ensure fairness and that any alleged shortcoming should result in a retrial rather than outright exoneration. Citing higher court rulings, the parties debate whether the correct remedy is setting aside the entire conviction or ordering a de novo trial.", "bench": [ "The Hon\u0027ble Mr. Justice P.Sam Koshy", "The Hon\u0027ble Mr. Justice Namavarapu Rajeshwar Rao" ], "case_number": [ "Crl.A No. 630 of 2024" ], "cases_referred": [ "Mohd. Hussain alias Zulfikar Ali vs State (Government of NCT of Delhi) [(2012) 9 SCC 408 : (2012) 3 SCC (Cri) 1139 : (2012) 2 SCC 584, decided on 31.08.2012]", "Ashok vs State of Uttar Pradesh [2024 SCC OnLine SC 3580]", "Kartar Singh vs State of Punjab [(1994) 3 SCC 569 : 1994 SCC (Cri) 899]", "State vs Mohd. Hussain [(2007) 140 DLT 428]", "Hussainara Khatoon (IV) vs Home Secy., State of Bihar", "M.H. Hoskot vs State of Maharashtra", "Anokhilal vs State of M.P. [5]", "ZahiraHabibulla H. Sheikh vs State of Gujarat [(2004) 4 SCC 158 : 2004 SCC (Cri) 999]", "Bashira vs State of U.P. [(1969) 1 SCR 32 : AIR 1968 SC 1313 : 1968 Cri LJ 1495]", "Ambadas Laxman Shinde vs State of Maharashtra [(2018) 18 SCC 788 : (2019) 3 SCC (Cri) 452 : (2018) 14 Scale 730]", "ImtiyazRamzan Khan vs State of Maharashtra (2018) 9 SCC 160" ], "chunkwise_data": { "chunk_1": { "analysis_of_arguments": "Counsel for the appellant argued that the evidence did not establish the appellant\u2019s culpability beyond a reasonable doubt, while the prosecution maintained that the facts and witness testimonies were sufficient to affirm the trial court\u2019s findings.", "cases_referred": [], "delivered_date": "18.12.2024", "facts": "The appellant was convicted by the I Additional Sessions Judge, Warangal, for offences arising from allegations that he physically assaulted his wife, leading to her death. After the victim was admitted to a hospital and subsequently succumbed to her injuries, the police modified the charges from attempted murder to murder. The complaint was lodged by the victim\u2019s father, prompting investigation and the eventual trial. The Sessions Court found the appellant guilty under several provisions, including those relating to cruelty and dowry offences. This criminal appeal challenges the lower court\u2019s conviction and sentence.", "final_status": "Not specified in the provided text", "formatted_summary": "This portion of the document details an appeal filed by the accused challenging his conviction and sentence under multiple charges, including cruelty, dowry offences, and murder. It narrates how the complainant\u2019s daughter was assaulted, hospitalized, and ultimately succumbed to her injuries. The Sessions Court convicted the appellant, prompting the current appeal in the High Court. Arguments focus on whether the evidence supports the conviction. The text does not specify the High Court\u2019s final determination.", "held": "No final determination by the High Court is provided in this excerpt.", "latin_principles": {}, "legal_issues": "Whether the trial court correctly convicted the appellant under charges of cruelty, dowry offences, and murder.", "prayer": null, "reserved_date": null, "statutes": { "Cr.P.C.": "Paragraph #1: The instant is an appeal filed by the appellant - accused under Section 374(2) of Cr.P.C . challenging the judgment of conviction dated 15.05.2024, in Sessions Case No.290 of 2022, passed by the I Additional Sessions Judge, Warangal.\n\nParagraph #6: The matter was thereafter committed to the I Addl. Sessions Judge at Warangal, where the case was registered as S. C.No.290 of 2022. The prosecution in all examined thirteen witnesses i.e. PWs.1 to 13 and also exhibited eleven witnesses i.e. Ex.P1 to P11. However, there was neither any witness nor any document exhibited on behalf of the defence. Later on, the statement of the appellant was recorded under Section 313 of Cr.P.C. and finally the impugned judgment was passed where the Trial Court found the appellant guilty for the offence punishable under Sections 498A and 302 of IPC and also convicted the appellant under Sections 3 and 4 of the Act.", "Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961": "Paragraph #3: Vide the impugned judgment, the appellant has been found guilty for the offence punishable under Section 498A of IPC and was sentenced to undergo simple imprisonment for a period of one year with a fine of Rs.5000/- and default stipulation. Likewise, having been found guilty for the offence punishable under Section 3 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 (for short, \u2018the Act\u2019) the appellant was sentenced to undergo simple imprisonment for a period of five years with fine of Rs.15,000/- with default stipulation. Further, the appellant was also found guilty for the offence punishable under Section 4 of the said Act and was sentenced to undergo simple imprisonment for a period of six months with fine of Rs.10,000/- with default stipulation. The appellant was also found guilty for the offence punishable under Section 302 of IPC and sentenced to undergo imprisonment for life with fine of Rs.1,000/- and default stipulation.", "IPC": "Paragraph #3: Vide the impugned judgment, the appellant has been found guilty for the offence punishable under Section 498A of IPC and was sentenced to undergo simple imprisonment for a period of one year with a fine of Rs.5000/- and default stipulation. Likewise, having been found guilty for the offence punishable under Section 3 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 (for short, \u2018the Act\u2019) the appellant was sentenced to undergo simple imprisonment for a period of five years with fine of Rs.15,000/- with default stipulation. Further, the appellant was also found guilty for the offence punishable under Section 4 of the said Act and was sentenced to undergo simple imprisonment for a period of six months with fine of Rs.10,000/- with default stipulation. The appellant was also found guilty for the offence punishable under Section 302 of IPC and sentenced to undergo imprisonment for life with fine of Rs.1,000/- and default stipulation." } }, "chunk_2": { "analysis_of_arguments": "The appellant contends that he was effectively unrepresented at crucial stages, preventing meaningful cross-examination of prosecution witnesses. The State responds that counsel was appointed for the appellant and that he did avail himself of legal assistance, arguing that the trial was conducted properly and in compliance with fairness requirements.", "cases_referred": [ "Mohd. Hussain alias Zulfikar Ali vs State (Government of NCT of Delhi) [2012 (2) SCC 584]", "Ashok vs State of Uttar Pradesh [2024 SCC OnLineSC 3580]", "Kartar Singh vs State of Punjab [(1994) 3 SCC 569]" ], "delivered_date": null, "facts": "The appellant was prosecuted after the deceased, who had been hospitalized and placed on a ventilator, succumbed to injuries on 12.09.2016. The police altered the charge to include Section 302 of IPC. A charge-sheet was filed, and the appellant was tried under Section 498A of IPC, Sections 3 and 4 of the referenced Act, and Section 302 of IPC. The case proceeded before the I Addl. Sessions Judge, Warangal, registering as S.C.No.290 of 2022. Thirteen witnesses were examined by the prosecution, and the appellant\u2019s statement was recorded under Section 313 of Cr.P.C., culminating in the impugned judgment of conviction at trial.", "final_status": "Not stated in the excerpt provided", "formatted_summary": "The excerpt details the prosecution of the appellant for offenses under Sections 498A and 302 of the IPC and Sections 3 and 4 of an unspecified Act following the death of the victim on 12.09.2016. The defense argues that the trial was vitiated due to inadequate representation, while the prosecution insists that counsel was provided. No conclusive final ruling is included, but the court observes potential deprivation of an effective defense.", "held": "No final decision is provided in the excerpt, but the Bench observes that the appellant may have been deprived of effective legal assistance at trial.", "latin_principles": {}, "legal_issues": "Whether the appellant was provided a fair trial and afforded effective legal representation during the proceedings constitutes the primary legal question.", "prayer": null, "reserved_date": null, "statutes": { "Cr.P.C.": "\u201cLater on, the statement of the appellant was recorded under Section 313 of Cr.P.C. and finally the impugned judgment was passed where the Trial Court found the appellant guilty for the offence punishable under Sections 498A and 302 of IPC and also convicted the appellant under Sections 3 and 4 of the Act.\u201d", "IPC": "\u201cIn the course of time, charge-sheet was filed and the appellant stood prosecuted for the offences under Section 498A of IPC and Sections 3 and 4 of the Act and Section 302 of IPC. Later on, the statement of the appellant was recorded under Section 313 of Cr.P.C. and finally the impugned judgment was passed where the Trial Court found the appellant guilty for the offence punishable under Sections 498A and 302 of IPC and also convicted the appellant under Sections 3 and 4 of the Act.\u201d", "the Act": "\u201cIn the course of time, charge-sheet was filed and the appellant stood prosecuted for the offences under Section 498A of IPC and Sections 3 and 4 of the Act and Section 302 of IPC. Later on, the statement of the appellant was recorded under Section 313 of Cr.P.C. and finally the impugned judgment was passed where the Trial Court found the appellant guilty for the offence punishable under Sections 498A and 302 of IPC and also convicted the appellant under Sections 3 and 4 of the Act.\u201d" } }, "chunk_3": { "analysis_of_arguments": "The appellant contends that the trial was unfair because crucial rights such as counsel assistance and cross-examination were denied. References are made to Supreme Court rulings emphasizing the necessity of counsel at all stages. From the opposing perspective, there is an implication that the original conviction should stand, but the excerpt primarily highlights the appellant\u2019s stance on the need for competent legal representation.", "cases_referred": [ "Mohd. Hussain alias Zulfikar Ali vs State (Government of NCT of Delhi) [(2012) 2 SCC 584]", "Ashok vs State of Uttar Pradesh [2024 SCC OnLine SC 3580]", "Kartar Singh vs State of Punjab [(1994) 3 SCC 569 : 1994 SCC (Cri) 899]", "State vs Mohd. Hussain [(2007) 140 DLT 428]" ], "delivered_date": "31.08.2012", "facts": "The excerpt discusses how the appellant was deprived of an effective legal defense during trial, citing Supreme Court precedents. It references the denial of counsel and inadequate cross-examination rights, leading to the conclusion that a fair trial was not provided. Earlier proceedings in higher courts resulted in a remand for a de novo trial, underscoring the significance of proper legal representation and the importance of ensuring the accused\u2019s right to cross-examination. No other specific procedural history about the present matter is provided in this portion.", "final_status": "Not mentioned in this snippet", "formatted_summary": "This section emphasizes that the appellant was denied a fair trial due to ineffective legal assistance, drawing on multiple Supreme Court decisions that outline the importance of counsel and cross-examination. The document cites examples of how courts handle situations where an accused does not receive proper representation, including setting aside convictions and ordering de novo trials.", "held": "The excerpt cites rulings where convictions were set aside due to denial of fairness in trial and highlights the Supreme Court\u2019s decision to remand matters for fresh disposal when the accused lacks effective legal counsel.", "latin_principles": {}, "legal_issues": "Whether the lack of effective legal assistance violated the right to a fair trial and whether a new trial should be granted due to inadequate defense opportunities.", "prayer": null, "reserved_date": null, "statutes": { "Code of Criminal Procedure, Section 304": "\u201c24. In the present case, not only was the accused denied the assistance of a counsel\u2026 The fact that the right involved is of such a character that it cannot be denied without violating those fundamental principles of liberty and justice\u2026 It is equally true that the absence of fair and proper trial would be violation of fundamental principles of judicial procedure on account of breach of mandatory provisions of Section 304 CrPC.\u201d", "Code of Criminal Procedure, Section 386": "\u201c42. The appellate court hearing a criminal appeal from a judgment of conviction has power to order the retrial of the accused under Section 386 of the Code\u2026 A de novo trial or retrial of the accused should be ordered by the appellate court in exceptional and rare cases and only when ends of justice so demand\u2026 These principles must apply as well when the appeal court is confronted with the question whether or not retrial of an accused should be ordered.\u201d", "Constitution of India, Article 21": "\u201c41. \u2018Speedy trial\u2019 and \u2018fair trial\u2019 to a person accused of a crime are integral part of Article 21. There is, however, qualitative difference between the right to speedy trial and the accused\u2019s right of fair trial\u2026 The factors concerning the accused\u2019s right to speedy trial have to be weighed vis-\u00e0-vis the impact of the crime on society and the confidence of the people in judicial system\u2026 These principles must apply as well when the appeal court is confronted with the question whether or not retrial\u2026 should be ordered.\u201d", "Indian Evidence Act": "\u201c14. The purpose of cross-examination of a witness has been succinctly explained by the Constitution Bench of this Court in Kartar Singh v. State of Punjab [(1994) 3 SCC 569 : 1994 SCC (Cri) 899]: (SCC p. 686, para 278) \u2018Section 137 of the Evidence Act defines what cross-examination means and Sections 139 and 145 speak of the mode of cross-examination with reference to the documents as well as oral evidence. It is the jurisprudence of law that cross-examination is an acid-test of the truthfulness of the statement made by a witness on oath\u2026\u2019\u201d" } }, "chunk_4": { "analysis_of_arguments": "The excerpt emphasizes an accused\u2019s right to speedy justice and fair representation, while noting that courts must also weigh broader societal interests. It underscores that retrials should not be ordered lightly and that the State bears the responsibility to provide proper legal assistance to indigent accused persons.", "cases_referred": [ "Hussainara Khatoon (IV) vs Home Secy., State of Bihar", "M.H. Hoskot vs State of Maharashtra" ], "delivered_date": null, "facts": "No factual background concerning the specific dispute or the parties involved appears in this excerpt. The text primarily sets out general observations about the right to a speedy trial, the conditions under which a retrial can be ordered, and the importance of timely legal aid for the accused.", "final_status": "No final status provided in this excerpt", "formatted_summary": "This excerpt examines an accused\u2019s right to a speedy trial, noting that any long delay must be weighed against the severity of the alleged crime and societal interests. It clarifies that an appellate court\u2019s power to order retrial under Section 386 of the Code of Criminal Procedure should be exercised sparingly and only to avoid a miscarriage of justice. The text also highlights the State\u2019s duty to provide timely legal aid, referencing key Supreme Court decisions which helped shape the constitutional right to counsel for those who cannot afford it.", "held": "No definitive holding or final conclusion is stated; the excerpt focuses on legal principles regarding accused persons\u2019 rights and the appellate court\u2019s scope to order retrial.", "latin_principles": { "de novo": "\u201cThough such power exists, it should not be exercised in a routine manner. A de novo trial or retrial of the accused should be ordered by the appellate court in exceptional and rare cases\u2026\u201d" }, "legal_issues": "Whether the accused\u2019s right to a speedy trial requires discontinuation of the prosecution if there has been a long delay; under what circumstances an appellate court may order a retrial; and the implications of failing to provide effective legal aid to the accused.", "prayer": null, "reserved_date": null, "statutes": { "Constitution of India": "\u201c19. After having perused the record of the case, we found a very disturbing feature. It is about the failure of the State to provide timely legal aid to the appellant. The other issue is about the quality of legal aid. Apart from provisions of Article 21 and Article 39A of the Constitution of India, the law on the issue of the right to legal aid has been evolved by this Court through its landmark decisions. This Court\u0027s first well-known decision is in the case of Hussainara Khatoon (IV) v. Home Secy., State of Bihar\u2026 The second decision is in the case of M.H. Hoskot v. State of Maharashtra\u2026 If a prisoner sentenced to imprisonment, is virtually unable to exercise his constitutional and statutory right of appeal, inclusive of special leave to appeal, for want of legal assistance, there is implicit in the Court under Article 142, read with Articles 21 and 39-A of the Constitution, power to assign counsel for such imprisoned individual.\u201d", "Criminal Procedure Code, 1973": "\u201c42. The appellate court hearing a criminal appeal from a judgment of conviction has power to order the retrial of the accused under Section 386 of the Code. That is clear from the bare language of Section 386(b). Though such power exists, it should not be exercised in a routine manner. A de novo trial or retrial of the accused should be ordered by the appellate court in exceptional and rare cases and only when in the opinion of the appellate court such course becomes indispensable to avert failure of justice. Surely this power cannot be used to allow the prosecution to improve upon its case or fill up the lacuna. A retrial is not the second trial; it is continuation of the same trial and same prosecution. The guiding factor for retrial must always be demand of justice. Obviously, the exercise of power of retrial under Section 386(b) of the Code, will depend on the facts and circumstances of each case for which no straitjacket formula can be formulated but the appeal court must closely keep in view that while protecting the right of an accused to fair trial and due process, the people who seek protection of law do not losehope in legal system and the interests of the society are not altogether overlooked.\u201d" } }, "chunk_5": { "analysis_of_arguments": "The discussion emphasizes the need for counsel to be assigned to an indigent accused, the duty of the State to compensate appointed lawyers, and the necessity of providing counsel with enough time to prepare the defense. No opposing arguments are detailed in this excerpt.", "cases_referred": [ "Anokhilal vs State of M.P. [5]", "ZahiraHabibulla H. Sheikh vs State of Gujarat [(2004) 4 SCC 158 : 2004 SCC (Cri) 999]", "Mohd. Hussain vs State (NCT of Delhi) [(2012) 9 SCC 408 : (2012) 3 SCC (Cri) 1139]", "Bashira vs State of U.P. [(1969) 1 SCR 32 : AIR 1968 SC 1313 : 1968 Cri LJ 1495]", "Ambadas Laxman Shinde vs State of Maharashtra [(2018) 18 SCC 788 : (2019) 3 SCC (Cri) 452 : (2018) 14 Scale 730]" ], "delivered_date": null, "facts": "This excerpt does not describe any specific factual background or procedural steps leading to a dispute. Instead, it focuses on the importance of free legal assistance for accused persons who lack resources, referencing multiple judicial decisions that highlight the State\u2019s duty to appoint counsel and ensure adequate time for trial preparation.", "final_status": "No final status indicated in the provided text.", "formatted_summary": "This portion of the judgment primarily addresses the significance of providing free legal representation to individuals facing imprisonment, including capital punishment, and underscores the State\u2019s responsibility to assign counsel where needed. Multiple decisions are cited, emphasizing that appointed counsel must possess adequate experience and be given sufficient time to prepare. The discussion clarifies that funding for such representation must come from the State, reflecting a broader commitment to fairness and equal access to justice.", "held": "The Court underscored the necessity of providing free legal representation to indigent accused, laid down qualifications for appointed counsel in capital cases, and mandated sufficient preparation time for a fair defense. It clarified that financing counsel fees is a State responsibility, thereby reinforcing the principle of fair access to justice.", "latin_principles": { "amicus curiae": "20.5. In Bashira [Bashira v. State of U.P., (1969) 1 SCR 32 : AIR 1968 SC 1313 : 1968 Cri LJ 1495] as well as in Ambadas [Ambadas Laxman Shinde v. State of Maharashtra, (2018) 18 SCC 788 : (2019) 3 SCC (Cri) 452 : (2018) 14 Scale 730], making substantial progress in the matter on the very day after a counsel was engaged as Amicus Curiae, was not accepted by this Court as compliance with \u201csufficient opportunity\u201d to the counsel." }, "legal_issues": "Whether and to what extent free legal aid must be provided to persons facing imprisonment or possible capital punishment, including the requisite qualifications for appointed counsel and minimum preparation time required to ensure a fair trial.", "prayer": null, "reserved_date": null, "statutes": { "Article 136 of the Constitution": "25. If a prisoner sentenced to imprisonment, is virtually unable to exercise his constitutional and statutory right of appeal, inclusive of special leave to appeal, for want of legal assistance, there is implicit in the Court under Article 142, read with Articles 21 and 39-A of the Constitution, power to assign counsel for such imprisoned individual \u201cfor doing complete justice\u201d. This is a necessary incident of the right of appeal conferred by the Code and allowed by Article 136 of the Constitution. The inference is inevitable that this is a State\u0027s duty and not Government\u0027s charity. Equally affirmative is the implication that while legal services must be free to the beneficiary, the lawyer himself has to be reasonably remunerated for his services. Surely, the profession has a public commitment to the people but mere philanthropy of its members yields short mileage in the long run. Their services, especially when they are on behalf of the State must be paid for. Naturally, the State concerned must pay a reasonable sum that the court may fix when assigning counsel to the prisoner. Of course, the court may judge the situation and consider from all angles whether it is necessary for the ends of justice to make available legal aid in the particular case. In every country where free legal services are given it is not done in all cases but only where public justice suffers otherwise. That discretion resides in the court.\u201d", "Article 142 of the Constitution": "25. If a prisoner sentenced to imprisonment, is virtually unable to exercise his constitutional and statutory right of appeal, inclusive of special leave to appeal, for want of legal assistance, there is implicit in the Court under Article 142, read with Articles 21 and 39-A of the Constitution, power to assign counsel for such imprisoned individual \u201cfor doing complete justice\u201d. This is a necessary incident of the right of appeal conferred by the Code and allowed by Article 136 of the Constitution. The inference is inevitable that this is a State\u0027s duty and not Government\u0027s charity. Equally affirmative is the implication that while legal services must be free to the beneficiary, the lawyer himself has to be reasonably remunerated for his services. Surely, the profession has a public commitment to the people but mere philanthropy of its members yields short mileage in the long run. Their services, especially when they are on behalf of the State must be paid for. Naturally, the State concerned must pay a reasonable sum that the court may fix when assigning counsel to the prisoner. Of course, the court may judge the situation and consider from all angles whether it is necessary for the ends of justice to make available legal aid in the particular case. In every country where free legal services are given it is not done in all cases but only where public justice suffers otherwise. That discretion resides in the court.\u201d", "Article 21 of the Constitution": "25. If a prisoner sentenced to imprisonment, is virtually unable to exercise his constitutional and statutory right of appeal, inclusive of special leave to appeal, for want of legal assistance, there is implicit in the Court under Article 142, read with Articles 21 and 39-A of the Constitution, power to assign counsel for such imprisoned individual \u201cfor doing complete justice\u201d. This is a necessary incident of the right of appeal conferred by the Code and allowed by Article 136 of the Constitution. The inference is inevitable that this is a State\u0027s duty and not Government\u0027s charity. Equally affirmative is the implication that while legal services must be free to the beneficiary, the lawyer himself has to be reasonably remunerated for his services. Surely, the profession has a public commitment to the people but mere philanthropy of its members yields short mileage in the long run. Their services, especially when they are on behalf of the State must be paid for. Naturally, the State concerned must pay a reasonable sum that the court may fix when assigning counsel to the prisoner. Of course, the court may judge the situation and consider from all angles whether it is necessary for the ends of justice to make available legal aid in the particular case. In every country where free legal services are given it is not done in all cases but only where public justice suffers otherwise. That discretion resides in the court.\u201d", "Article 39-A of the Constitution": "20.1. Article 39-A inserted by the 42nd Amendment to the Constitution, effected in the year 1977, provides for free legal aid to ensure that opportunities for securing justice are not denied to any citizen by reason of economic or other disabilities. The statutory regime put in place including the enactment of the Legal Services Authorities Act, 1987 is designed to achieve the mandate of Article 39-A.", "Legal Services Authorities Act, 1987": "20.1. Article 39-A inserted by the 42nd Amendment to the Constitution, effected in the year 1977, provides for free legal aid to ensure that opportunities for securing justice are not denied to any citizen by reason of economic or other disabilities. The statutory regime put in place including the enactment of the Legal Services Authorities Act, 1987 is designed to achieve the mandate of Article 39-A.", "the Code": "25. If a prisoner sentenced to imprisonment, is virtually unable to exercise his constitutional and statutory right of appeal, inclusive of special leave to appeal, for want of legal assistance, there is implicit in the Court under Article 142, read with Articles 21 and 39-A of the Constitution, power to assign counsel for such imprisoned individual \u201cfor doing complete justice\u201d. This is a necessary incident of the right of appeal conferred by the Code and allowed by Article 136 of the Constitution. The inference is inevitable that this is a State\u0027s duty and not Government\u0027s charity. Equally affirmative is the implication that while legal services must be free to the beneficiary, the lawyer himself has to be reasonably remunerated for his services. Surely, the profession has a public commitment to the people but mere philanthropy of its members yields short mileage in the long run. Their services, especially when they are on behalf of the State must be paid for. Naturally, the State concerned must pay a reasonable sum that the court may fix when assigning counsel to the prisoner. Of course, the court may judge the situation and consider from all angles whether it is necessary for the ends of justice to make available legal aid in the particular case. In every country where free legal services are given it is not done in all cases but only where public justice suffers otherwise. That discretion resides in the court.\u201d" } }, "chunk_6": { "analysis_of_arguments": "The text focuses on the Court\u2019s perspective, noting that when accused persons are unrepresented or not properly aided, prosecutorial and judicial duties must intervene. There is limited mention of contradictory arguments from the defense or prosecution, but the central theme is ensuring fairness and counsel\u2019s effectiveness in criminal trials.", "cases_referred": [ "ImtiyazRamzan Khan vs State of Maharashtra (2018) 9 SCC 160" ], "delivered_date": null, "facts": "The text primarily addresses the situation where an accused was not adequately represented by counsel at critical stages of a criminal trial. It highlights that the accused was unrepresented at the time charges were framed and that subsequent legal aid may not have been effective. The Supreme Court then issues guidelines on ensuring proper legal representation, indicating that the matter arose from concerns about fairness and procedural correctness in trials where an accused does not have private counsel.", "final_status": "No final disposition indicated in this excerpt.", "formatted_summary": "This section discusses the Supreme Court\u2019s guidelines regarding legal aid for accused persons who lack representation. The Court stresses the obligation of public prosecutors and judges to assure fair preparation time, effective assistance of counsel, and continuous representation throughout the proceeding, especially in serious criminal cases that may involve life or death sentences.", "held": "The Court emphasizes the fundamental right to effective legal aid at all stages of the criminal process and mandates that trial courts, along with prosecutors, must ensure that no accused is left without proper representation. It sets out guidelines on the qualifications of appointed counsel and the duty of courts to appoint experienced legal aid lawyers in serious cases.", "latin_principles": { "amicus curiae": "\u201c\u2026in all the cases where there is a possibility of a life sentence or death sentence, only those learned advocates who have put in a minimum of ten years of practice on the criminal side should be considered to be appointed as amicus curiae or as a legal aid advocate.\u201d" }, "legal_issues": "Whether courts and public prosecutors must ensure adequate legal representation for accused persons, especially where life or death sentences are possible, and the extent of obligations to provide fair trial safeguards.", "prayer": null, "reserved_date": null, "statutes": { "Constitution of India": "\u201ck. The right of the accused to defend himself in a criminal trial is guaranteed by Article 21 of the Constitution of India. He is entitled to a fair trial. But if effective legal aid is not made available to an accused who is unable to engage an advocate, it will amount to infringement of his fundamental rights guaranteed by Article 21...\u201d", "CrPC": "\u201cd. It is the duty of the Public Prosecutor to assist the Trial Court in recording the statement of the accused under Section 313 of the CrPC. If the Court omits to put any material circumstance brought on record against the accused, the Public Prosecutor must bring it to the notice of the Court while the examination of the accused is being recorded. He must assist the Court in framing the questions to be put to the accused.\u201d" } }, "chunk_7": { "analysis_of_arguments": "The appellant\u2019s counsel relied on a recent Supreme Court decision favoring quashing the conviction outright in cases of deficient legal aid. The prosecution countered with a larger Bench ruling advising that the solution in such situations is a remand for de novo trial to ensure proper representation.", "cases_referred": [ "Mohd. Hussain alias Zulfikar Ali vs. State (Government of NCT of Delhi) [larger Bench dated 31.08.2012]" ], "delivered_date": "18.12.2024", "facts": "The appellant was convicted on 15.05.2024 in Sessions Case No.290 of 2022 by the I Additional Sessions Judge, Warangal. He later appealed, asserting that his trial was vitiated because he did not receive effective legal representation. The present proceedings focus on whether the lack of legal aid rendered his conviction unsustainable and whether the correct remedy is outright acquittal or a remand for fresh trial. Consequently, the matter has reached the present appellate stage, resulting in an order to conduct a de novo trial.", "final_status": "Appeal allowed in part and the case remanded for a fresh de novo trial.", "formatted_summary": "This section underscores that effective legal aid is integral to an accused\u2019s right to a fair trial under Article 21 of the Constitution of India. The Court discusses prior Supreme Court precedents on whether lack of proper representation wholly invalidates a conviction or merely warrants a fresh trial. Citing the larger Bench view, the Court opts to remand the matter for a de novo trial, setting aside the original conviction and mandating expedited proceedings. The appellant is afforded the opportunity to secure counsel of choice or, failing that, legal aid from the court.", "held": "The Court set aside the appellant\u2019s conviction and remanded the matter for a new trial, emphasizing the fundamental need for effective legal aid to safeguard the right to a fair trial. The Trial Court was instructed to conclude the proceedings expeditiously, ideally within four months, ensuring the appellant has competent legal representation.", "latin_principles": {}, "legal_issues": "Whether the appellant\u2019s trial was fatally flawed by inadequate legal aid, and if so, whether the proper relief is setting aside the conviction in its entirety or directing a new trial.", "prayer": null, "reserved_date": null, "statutes": { "Code of Criminal Procedure": "21. Another aspect which we find is that, in the recent decision of the Hon\u2019ble Supreme Court in the case of Ashok (supra), there is no reference of the three Judge Bench judgment of the Hon\u2019ble Supreme Court in the case of Mohd. Hussain alias Zulfikar Ali vs. State (Government of NCT of Delhi) , (larger Bench) dated 31.08.2012. The case of Ashok (supra) was dealt with by the Hon\u2019ble Supreme Court on an entirely different factual situation where it was found that the statement of the accused under Section 313 of Cr.P.C . to be highly improbable and inadequate, coupled with the fact that the accused was not provided with any legal aid in his defence. Whereas, the larger Bench decision of the Hon\u2019ble Supreme Court was primarily on the terms of referenc e of whether the matter under such circumstances where admittedly the trial is vitiated has to be remanded back for a de novo trial or not .", "Constitution of India": "k. The right of the accused to defend himself in a criminal trial is guaranteed by Article 21 of the Constitution of India. He is entitled to a fair trial. But if effective legal aid is not made available to an accused who is unable to engage an advocate, it will amount to infringement of his fundamental rights guaranteed by Article 21;" } }, "chunk_8": { "analysis_of_arguments": "No arguments by either party are discussed in this excerpt.", "cases_referred": [], "delivered_date": "18.12.2024", "facts": "No factual background is provided in this excerpt. The text primarily contains directions for the conduct of the trial and instructions to the Public Prosecutor and the appellant.", "final_status": "disposed with directions", "formatted_summary": "This section of the document directs the trial Court to expedite the proceedings and complete the trial within four months, advises the Public Prosecutor to eliminate unnecessary witnesses, and permits the appellant to secure counsel. It closes pending miscellaneous applications and indicates the order date of 18.12.2024.", "held": "The Court directed that the trial be concluded within four months, instructed the Public Prosecutor to drop irrelevant witnesses, and allowed the appellant to engage counsel or receive legal-aid assistance.", "latin_principles": {}, "legal_issues": "No specific legal issues are detailed in the excerpt.", "prayer": null, "reserved_date": null, "statutes": {} } }, "counsels": [ "Mr. Y. Soma Srinath Reddy (for the Appellant)", "M/s. Harsheet Reddy Law Firm (for the Appellant)", "Mrs. Shalini Saxena (for the Respondent)" ], "delivered_date": "18.12.2024", "facts": "The appellant was charged with physically assaulting his wife, who later died on 12.09.2016 from her injuries. The victim\u2019s father lodged a complaint leading to an investigation and trial. The police initially charged attempted murder but later included murder charges under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code. The I Additional Sessions Judge, Warangal, convicted the appellant on 15.05.2024 for cruelty, dowry offences, and murder. The appellant contends that he was deprived of effective legal representation during trial. This appeal challenges the conviction and seeks determination of whether inadequate legal aid invalidates the verdict or warrants a fresh trial.", "final_status": "Appeal partly allowed and disposed with directions for a fresh de novo trial.", "first_party": [ "1. Maloth Ravi, S/o. Chandru" ], "grouped_statutes": { "Article 136 of the Constitution": [ "25. If a prisoner sentenced to imprisonment, is virtually unable to exercise his constitutional and statutory right of appeal, inclusive of special leave to appeal, for want of legal assistance, there is implicit in the Court under Article 142, read with Articles 21 and 39-A of the Constitution, power to assign counsel for such imprisoned individual \u201cfor doing complete justice\u201d. This is a necessary incident of the right of appeal conferred by the Code and allowed by Article 136 of the Constitution. The inference is inevitable that this is a State\u0027s duty and not Government\u0027s charity. Equally affirmative is the implication that while legal services must be free to the beneficiary, the lawyer himself has to be reasonably remunerated for his services. Surely, the profession has a public commitment to the people but mere philanthropy of its members yields short mileage in the long run. Their services, especially when they are on behalf of the State must be paid for. Naturally, the State concerned must pay a reasonable sum that the court may fix when assigning counsel to the prisoner. Of course, the court may judge the situation and consider from all angles whether it is necessary for the ends of justice to make available legal aid in the particular case. In every country where free legal services are given it is not done in all cases but only where public justice suffers otherwise. That discretion resides in the court.\u201d" ], "Article 142 of the Constitution": [ "25. If a prisoner sentenced to imprisonment, is virtually unable to exercise his constitutional and statutory right of appeal, inclusive of special leave to appeal, for want of legal assistance, there is implicit in the Court under Article 142, read with Articles 21 and 39-A of the Constitution, power to assign counsel for such imprisoned individual \u201cfor doing complete justice\u201d. This is a necessary incident of the right of appeal conferred by the Code and allowed by Article 136 of the Constitution. The inference is inevitable that this is a State\u0027s duty and not Government\u0027s charity. Equally affirmative is the implication that while legal services must be free to the beneficiary, the lawyer himself has to be reasonably remunerated for his services. Surely, the profession has a public commitment to the people but mere philanthropy of its members yields short mileage in the long run. Their services, especially when they are on behalf of the State must be paid for. Naturally, the State concerned must pay a reasonable sum that the court may fix when assigning counsel to the prisoner. Of course, the court may judge the situation and consider from all angles whether it is necessary for the ends of justice to make available legal aid in the particular case. In every country where free legal services are given it is not done in all cases but only where public justice suffers otherwise. That discretion resides in the court.\u201d" ], "Article 21 of the Constitution": [ "25. If a prisoner sentenced to imprisonment, is virtually unable to exercise his constitutional and statutory right of appeal, inclusive of special leave to appeal, for want of legal assistance, there is implicit in the Court under Article 142, read with Articles 21 and 39-A of the Constitution, power to assign counsel for such imprisoned individual \u201cfor doing complete justice\u201d. This is a necessary incident of the right of appeal conferred by the Code and allowed by Article 136 of the Constitution. The inference is inevitable that this is a State\u0027s duty and not Government\u0027s charity. Equally affirmative is the implication that while legal services must be free to the beneficiary, the lawyer himself has to be reasonably remunerated for his services. Surely, the profession has a public commitment to the people but mere philanthropy of its members yields short mileage in the long run. Their services, especially when they are on behalf of the State must be paid for. Naturally, the State concerned must pay a reasonable sum that the court may fix when assigning counsel to the prisoner. Of course, the court may judge the situation and consider from all angles whether it is necessary for the ends of justice to make available legal aid in the particular case. In every country where free legal services are given it is not done in all cases but only where public justice suffers otherwise. That discretion resides in the court.\u201d" ], "Article 39-A of the Constitution": [ "20.1. Article 39-A inserted by the 42nd Amendment to the Constitution, effected in the year 1977, provides for free legal aid to ensure that opportunities for securing justice are not denied to any citizen by reason of economic or other disabilities. The statutory regime put in place including the enactment of the Legal Services Authorities Act, 1987 is designed to achieve the mandate of Article 39-A." ], "Code of Criminal Procedure": [ "21. Another aspect which we find is that, in the recent decision of the Hon\u2019ble Supreme Court in the case of Ashok (supra), there is no reference of the three Judge Bench judgment of the Hon\u2019ble Supreme Court in the case of Mohd. Hussain alias Zulfikar Ali vs. State (Government of NCT of Delhi) , (larger Bench) dated 31.08.2012. The case of Ashok (supra) was dealt with by the Hon\u2019ble Supreme Court on an entirely different factual situation where it was found that the statement of the accused under Section 313 of Cr.P.C . to be highly improbable and inadequate, coupled with the fact that the accused was not provided with any legal aid in his defence. Whereas, the larger Bench decision of the Hon\u2019ble Supreme Court was primarily on the terms of reference of whether the matter under such circumstances where admittedly the trial is vitiated has to be remanded back for a de novo trial or not ." ], "Code of Criminal Procedure, Section 304": [ "\u201c24. In the present case, not only was the accused denied the assistance of a counsel\u2026 The fact that the right involved is of such a character that it cannot be denied without violating those fundamental principles of liberty and justice\u2026 It is equally true that the absence of fair and proper trial would be violation of fundamental principles of judicial procedure on account of breach of mandatory provisions of Section 304 CrPC.\u201d" ], "Code of Criminal Procedure, Section 386": [ "\u201c42. The appellate court hearing a criminal appeal from a judgment of conviction has power to order the retrial of the accused under Section 386 of the Code\u2026 A de novo trial or retrial of the accused should be ordered by the appellate court in exceptional and rare cases and only when ends of justice so demand\u2026 These principles must apply as well when the appeal court is confronted with the question whether or not retrial of an accused should be ordered.\u201d" ], "Constitution of India": [ "\u201c19. After having perused the record of the case, we found a very disturbing feature. It is about the failure of the State to provide timely legal aid to the appellant. The other issue is about the quality of legal aid. Apart from provisions of Article 21 and Article 39A of the Constitution of India, the law on the issue of the right to legal aid has been evolved by this Court through its landmark decisions. This Court\u0027s first well-known decision is in the case of Hussainara Khatoon (IV) v. Home Secy., State of Bihar\u2026 The second decision is in the case of M.H. Hoskot v. State of Maharashtra\u2026 If a prisoner sentenced to imprisonment, is virtually unable to exercise his constitutional and statutory right of appeal, inclusive of special leave to appeal, for want of legal assistance, there is implicit in the Court under Article 142, read with Articles 21 and 39-A of the Constitution, power to assign counsel for such imprisoned individual.\u201d", "\u201ck. The right of the accused to defend himself in a criminal trial is guaranteed by Article 21 of the Constitution of India. He is entitled to a fair trial. But if effective legal aid is not made available to an accused who is unable to engage an advocate, it will amount to infringement of his fundamental rights guaranteed by Article 21...\u201d", "k. The right of the accused to defend himself in a criminal trial is guaranteed by Article 21 of the Constitution of India. He is entitled to a fair trial. But if effective legal aid is not made available to an accused who is unable to engage an advocate, it will amount to infringement of his fundamental rights guaranteed by Article 21;" ], "Constitution of India, Article 21": [ "\u201c41. \u2018Speedy trial\u2019 and \u2018fair trial\u2019 to a person accused of a crime are integral part of Article 21. There is, however, qualitative difference between the right to speedy trial and the accused\u2019s right of fair trial\u2026 The factors concerning the accused\u2019s right to speedy trial have to be weighed vis-\u00e0-vis the impact of the crime on society and the confidence of the people in judicial system\u2026 These principles must apply as well when the appeal court is confronted with the question whether or not retrial\u2026 should be ordered.\u201d" ], "Cr.P.C.": [ "Paragraph #1: The instant is an appeal filed by the appellant - accused under Section 374(2) of Cr.P.C . challenging the judgment of conviction dated 15.05.2024, in Sessions Case No.290 of 2022, passed by the I Additional Sessions Judge, Warangal.\n\nParagraph #6: The matter was thereafter committed to the I Addl. Sessions Judge at Warangal, where the case was registered as S. C.No.290 of 2022. The prosecution in all examined thirteen witnesses i.e. PWs.1 to 13 and also exhibited eleven witnesses i.e. Ex.P1 to P11. However, there was neither any witness nor any document exhibited on behalf of the defence. Later on, the statement of the appellant was recorded under Section 313 of Cr.P.C. and finally the impugned judgment was passed where the Trial Court found the appellant guilty for the offence punishable under Sections 498A and 302 of IPC and also convicted the appellant under Sections 3 and 4 of the Act.", "\u201cIn the course of time, charge-sheet was filed and the appellant stood prosecuted for the offences under Section 498A of IPC and Sections 3 and 4 of the Act and Section 302 of IPC. Later on, the statement of the appellant was recorded under Section 313 of Cr.P.C. and finally the impugned judgment was passed where the Trial Court found the appellant guilty for the offence punishable under Sections 498A and 302 of IPC and also convicted the appellant under Sections 3 and 4 of the Act.\u201d" ], "CrPC": [ "\u201cd. It is the duty of the Public Prosecutor to assist the Trial Court in recording the statement of the accused under Section 313 of the CrPC. If the Court omits to put any material circumstance brought on record against the accused, the Public Prosecutor must bring it to the notice of the Court while the examination of the accused is being recorded. He must assist the Court in framing the questions to be put to the accused.\u201d" ], "Criminal Procedure Code, 1973": [ "\u201c42. The appellate court hearing a criminal appeal from a judgment of conviction has power to order the retrial of the accused under Section 386 of the Code. That is clear from the bare language of Section 386(b). Though such power exists, it should not be exercised in a routine manner. A de novo trial or retrial of the accused should be ordered by the appellate court in exceptional and rare cases and only when in the opinion of the appellate court such course becomes indispensable to avert failure of justice. Surely this power cannot be used to allow the prosecution to improve upon its case or fill up the lacuna. A retrial is not the second trial; it is continuation of the same trial and same prosecution. The guiding factor for retrial must always be demand of justice. Obviously, the exercise of power of retrial under Section 386(b) of the Code, will depend on the facts and circumstances of each case for which no straitjacket formula can be formulated but the appeal court must closely keep in view that while protecting the right of an accused to fair trial and due process, the people who seek protection of law do not losehope in legal system and the interests of the society are not altogether overlooked.\u201d" ], "Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961": [ "Paragraph #3: Vide the impugned judgment, the appellant has been found guilty for the offence punishable under Section 498A of IPC and was sentenced to undergo simple imprisonment for a period of one year with a fine of Rs.5000/- and default stipulation. Likewise, having been found guilty for the offence punishable under Section 3 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 (for short, \u2018the Act\u2019) the appellant was sentenced to undergo simple imprisonment for a period of five years with fine of Rs.15,000/- with default stipulation. Further, the appellant was also found guilty for the offence punishable under Section 4 of the said Act and was sentenced to undergo simple imprisonment for a period of six months with fine of Rs.10,000/- with default stipulation. The appellant was also found guilty for the offence punishable under Section 302 of IPC and sentenced to undergo imprisonment for life with fine of Rs.1,000/- and default stipulation." ], "IPC": [ "Paragraph #3: Vide the impugned judgment, the appellant has been found guilty for the offence punishable under Section 498A of IPC and was sentenced to undergo simple imprisonment for a period of one year with a fine of Rs.5000/- and default stipulation. Likewise, having been found guilty for the offence punishable under Section 3 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 (for short, \u2018the Act\u2019) the appellant was sentenced to undergo simple imprisonment for a period of five years with fine of Rs.15,000/- with default stipulation. Further, the appellant was also found guilty for the offence punishable under Section 4 of the said Act and was sentenced to undergo simple imprisonment for a period of six months with fine of Rs.10,000/- with default stipulation. The appellant was also found guilty for the offence punishable under Section 302 of IPC and sentenced to undergo imprisonment for life with fine of Rs.1,000/- and default stipulation.", "\u201cIn the course of time, charge-sheet was filed and the appellant stood prosecuted for the offences under Section 498A of IPC and Sections 3 and 4 of the Act and Section 302 of IPC. Later on, the statement of the appellant was recorded under Section 313 of Cr.P.C. and finally the impugned judgment was passed where the Trial Court found the appellant guilty for the offence punishable under Sections 498A and 302 of IPC and also convicted the appellant under Sections 3 and 4 of the Act.\u201d" ], "Indian Evidence Act": [ "\u201c14. The purpose of cross-examination of a witness has been succinctly explained by the Constitution Bench of this Court in Kartar Singh v. State of Punjab [(1994) 3 SCC 569 : 1994 SCC (Cri) 899]: (SCC p. 686, para 278) \u2018Section 137 of the Evidence Act defines what cross-examination means and Sections 139 and 145 speak of the mode of cross-examination with reference to the documents as well as oral evidence. It is the jurisprudence of law that cross-examination is an acid-test of the truthfulness of the statement made by a witness on oath\u2026\u2019\u201d" ], "Legal Services Authorities Act, 1987": [ "20.1. Article 39-A inserted by the 42nd Amendment to the Constitution, effected in the year 1977, provides for free legal aid to ensure that opportunities for securing justice are not denied to any citizen by reason of economic or other disabilities. The statutory regime put in place including the enactment of the Legal Services Authorities Act, 1987 is designed to achieve the mandate of Article 39-A." ], "the Act": [ "\u201cIn the course of time, charge-sheet was filed and the appellant stood prosecuted for the offences under Section 498A of IPC and Sections 3 and 4 of the Act and Section 302 of IPC. Later on, the statement of the appellant was recorded under Section 313 of Cr.P.C. and finally the impugned judgment was passed where the Trial Court found the appellant guilty for the offence punishable under Sections 498A and 302 of IPC and also convicted the appellant under Sections 3 and 4 of the Act.\u201d" ], "the Code": [ "25. If a prisoner sentenced to imprisonment, is virtually unable to exercise his constitutional and statutory right of appeal, inclusive of special leave to appeal, for want of legal assistance, there is implicit in the Court under Article 142, read with Articles 21 and 39-A of the Constitution, power to assign counsel for such imprisoned individual \u201cfor doing complete justice\u201d. This is a necessary incident of the right of appeal conferred by the Code and allowed by Article 136 of the Constitution. The inference is inevitable that this is a State\u0027s duty and not Government\u0027s charity. Equally affirmative is the implication that while legal services must be free to the beneficiary, the lawyer himself has to be reasonably remunerated for his services. Surely, the profession has a public commitment to the people but mere philanthropy of its members yields short mileage in the long run. Their services, especially when they are on behalf of the State must be paid for. Naturally, the State concerned must pay a reasonable sum that the court may fix when assigning counsel to the prisoner. Of course, the court may judge the situation and consider from all angles whether it is necessary for the ends of justice to make available legal aid in the particular case. In every country where free legal services are given it is not done in all cases but only where public justice suffers otherwise. That discretion resides in the court.\u201d" ] }, "held": "The Court found that the appellant\u2019s conviction was vitiated by inadequate legal representation and ordered a retrial to safeguard the fundamental right to a fair trial. It emphasized the necessity for competent legal aid at every critical stage and directed the lower court to conclude the proceedings expeditiously with proper defense arrangements.", "latin_principles": { "amicus curiae": "\u201c20.5. In Bashira as well as in Ambadas, making substantial progress in the matter on the very day after a counsel was engaged as Amicus Curiae was not accepted\u2026 In serious cases, only advocates with sufficient experience on the criminal side should be considered for appointment as amicus curiae or as legal aid counsel.\u201d", "de novo": "\u201cThough such power exists, it should not be exercised in a routine manner. A de novo trial or retrial of the accused should be ordered by the appellate court in exceptional and rare cases\u2026\u201d" }, "legal_issues": [ "Whether the trial court correctly convicted the appellant under charges of cruelty, dowry offences, and murder", "whether the appellant was provided a fair trial and afforded effective legal representation", "whether the lack of effective legal assistance violated the right to a fair trial and warranted a new trial", "whether the accused\u2019s right to a speedy trial requires discontinuation of prosecution in the event of long delay and the implications of failing to provide effective legal aid", "whether free legal aid must be provided to persons facing imprisonment or possible capital punishment and the requisite qualifications for appointed counsel", "whether courts and public prosecutors must ensure adequate legal representation in serious criminal cases", "and whether the appellant\u2019s trial was fatally flawed by inadequate legal aid necessitating setting aside the conviction or directing a new trial." ], "location": "Hyderabad", "prayer": "The instant is an appeal filed by the appellant - accused under Section 374(2) of Cr.P.C . challenging the judgment of conviction dated 15.05.2024, in Sessions Case No.290 of 2022, passed by the I Additional Sessions Judge, Warangal.", "reserved_date": null, "second_party": [ "1. The State of Telangana." ], "statutes": { "Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973": "Paragraph #1 (from first excerpt): The instant is an appeal filed by the appellant - accused under Section 374(2) of Cr.P.C. challenging the judgment of conviction dated 15.05.2024, in Sessions Case No.290 of 2022, passed by the I Additional Sessions Judge, Warangal.\n\nParagraph #6 (from first excerpt): The matter was thereafter committed to the I Addl. Sessions Judge at Warangal, where the case was registered as S.C.No.290 of 2022. The prosecution in all examined thirteen witnesses i.e. PWs.1 to 13 and also exhibited eleven witnesses i.e. Ex.P1 to P11. However, there was neither any witness nor any document exhibited on behalf of the defence. Later on, the statement of the appellant was recorded under Section 313 of Cr.P.C. and finally the impugned judgment was passed where the Trial Court found the appellant guilty for the offence punishable under Sections 498A and 302 of IPC and also convicted the appellant under Sections 3 and 4 of the Act.\n\n(from second excerpt): Later on, the statement of the appellant was recorded under Section 313 of Cr.P.C. and finally the impugned judgment was passed where the Trial Court found the appellant guilty.\n\nCode of Criminal Procedure, Section 304 (from third excerpt): \u201c24. In the present case, not only was the accused denied the assistance of a counsel\u2026 It is equally true that the absence of fair and proper trial would be violation of fundamental principles of judicial procedure on account of breach of mandatory provisions of Section 304 CrPC.\u201d\n\nCode of Criminal Procedure, Section 386 (from third excerpt): \u201c42. The appellate court hearing a criminal appeal from a judgment of conviction has power to order the retrial of the accused under Section 386 of the Code\u2026 A de novo trial or retrial of the accused should be ordered by the appellate court in exceptional and rare cases and only when ends of justice so demand\u2026 These principles must apply as well when the appeal court is confronted with the question whether or not retrial of an accused should be ordered.\u201d\n\nCriminal Procedure Code, 1973 (from fourth excerpt): \u201c42. The appellate court hearing a criminal appeal from a judgment of conviction has power to order the retrial of the accused under Section 386 of the Code. That is clear from the bare language of Section 386(b)\u2026 The guiding factor for retrial must always be demand of justice\u2026\u201d\n\n(from sixth excerpt): \u201cd. It is the duty of the Public Prosecutor to assist the Trial Court in recording the statement of the accused under Section 313 of the CrPC. If the Court omits to put any material circumstance\u2026 he must assist the Court in framing the questions\u2026\u201d\n\n(from seventh excerpt): \u201c\u2026the larger Bench decision of the Hon\u2019ble Supreme Court was primarily on the terms of reference of whether the matter under such circumstances\u2026 has to be remanded back for a de novo trial or not.\u201d\n\nOverall references also use the term \u201cthe Code\u201d to denote the Criminal Procedure Code, indicating that the State must properly fund and ensure legal representation for indigent accused.\n", "Constitution of India": "Article 21 (from multiple excerpts): Emphasizes the right to a fair trial as part of the fundamental rights guaranteed by the Constitution. Lack of effective legal aid or denial of counsel is held to be an infringement of this right.\n\nArticle 39-A (from fifth excerpt): Inserted by the 42nd Amendment to the Constitution, ensuring free legal aid so that opportunities for securing justice are not denied to any citizen by reason of economic or other disabilities.\n\nArticle 136 (from fifth excerpt): Recognizes the power of the Supreme Court to grant special leave to appeal. In cases where the accused cannot afford counsel, the Court has the authority to assign counsel to ensure complete justice.\n\nArticle 142 (from fifth excerpt): Grants the Supreme Court the power to pass such orders as are necessary for doing complete justice in any cause or matter, underscoring the obligation to provide legal aid when required.\n\n(from sixth and seventh excerpts): Guaranteeing the right of the accused to defend himself and specifying that effective representation is necessary in serious cases where life or death sentences are involved.", "Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961": "Paragraph #3 (from first excerpt): \u201c\u2026having been found guilty for the offence punishable under Section 3 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 (for short, \u2018the Act\u2019) the appellant was sentenced to undergo simple imprisonment for a period of five years with fine of Rs.15,000/-. Further, the appellant was also found guilty for the offence punishable under Section 4 of the said Act\u2026 The appellant was also found guilty for the offence punishable under Section 302 of IPC\u2026\u201d\n\n(from second excerpt referring to \u201cthe Act\u201d): \u201cLater on, the statement of the appellant was recorded under Section 313 of Cr.P.C. and finally the impugned judgment was passed where the Trial Court found the appellant guilty for the offence punishable under Sections 498A and 302 of IPC and also convicted the appellant under Sections 3 and 4 of the Act.\u201d", "Indian Evidence Act": "14. The purpose of cross-examination of a witness has been succinctly explained by the Constitution Bench of this Court in Kartar Singh v. State of Punjab [(1994) 3 SCC 569 : 1994 SCC (Cri) 899]: (SCC p. 686, para 278) \u201c\u2026It is the jurisprudence of law that cross-examination is an acid-test of the truthfulness of the statement made by a witness on oath\u2026\u201d", "Indian Penal Code": "Paragraph #3 (from first excerpt): Vide the impugned judgment, the appellant has been found guilty for the offence punishable under Section 498A of IPC and was sentenced to undergo simple imprisonment for a period of one year\u2026 The appellant was also found guilty for the offence punishable under Section 302 of IPC and sentenced to undergo imprisonment for life with fine.\n\n(from second excerpt): \u201cIn the course of time, charge-sheet was filed and the appellant stood prosecuted for the offences under Section 498A of IPC and Sections 3 and 4 of the Act and Section 302 of IPC\u2026\u201d", "Legal Services Authorities Act, 1987": "20.1. Article 39-A inserted by the 42nd Amendment to the Constitution, effected in the year 1977, provides for free legal aid to ensure that opportunities for securing justice are not denied to any citizen on account of economic or other disabilities. The statutory regime put in place, including the enactment of the Legal Services Authorities Act, 1987, is designed to fulfill the objective of Article 39-A." }, "statutes_headnotes": { "Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973": "\u2014 Right to Legal Aid and fair trial \u2014 Duty of Public Prosecutor \u2014 Section 313 CrPC crucial for accused \u2014 Appeal under Section 374(2) \u2014 Sections 304 and 386 empower Court to ensure legal aid and order retrial \u2014 Constitutional safeguards under Articles 21 and 39-A \u2014 Indigent accused entitled to counsel at State expense \u2014 Inadequate representation vitiates conviction \u2014 De novo or retrial ordered \u2014 Prompt disposal with proper defense arrangements mandated.", "Constitution of India": "\u2014 Court\u2019s power to do complete justice under Article 142 \u2014 Right to free legal aid and fair trial guaranteed under Articles 21 and 39-A \u2014 State\u2019s obligation, not mere charity, to provide counsel and fair remuneration \u2014 42nd Amendment, 1977, inserted Article 39-A ensuring no denial of justice due to economic or other disabilities \u2014 Inadequate representation vitiates conviction \u2014 Courts may set aside conviction and order retrial or de novo trial \u2014 Prompt disposal with competent counsel mandated \u2014 Powers under Articles 136 and 142 invoked to secure fundamental rights \u2014 Complemented by Legal Services Authorities Act, 1987.", "Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961": "\u2014 Sections 3 and 4 \u2014 Dowry offences \u2014 Additional charges of cruelty and murder under IPC \u2014 Right to legal aid under Articles 21 and 39-A of Constitution must be upheld \u2014 Inadequate legal representation vitiates fair trial \u2014 Court emphasizes necessity of competent defense at every stage \u2014 Conviction set aside, retrial ordered to preserve fundamental rights \u2014 Directions for adequate legal aid, expeditious disposal.", "Indian Evidence Act": "\u2014 Cross-Examination \u2014 Purpose \u2014 Section 137 of Evidence Act enumerates cross-examination as an acid test of truthfulness \u2014 Constitution Bench in Kartar Singh v. State of Punjab, (1994) 3 SCC 569, highlighted its significance \u2014 Inadequate legal assistance preventing effective cross-examination vitiates fair trial \u2014 Right to legal aid under Articles 21 and 39-A ensures meaningful defense at all stages \u2014 Conviction set aside due to lack of fair opportunity to cross-examine \u2014 De novo trial directed to uphold fairness.", "Indian Penal Code": "\u2014 Sections 498A \u0026 302 \u2014 Conviction for cruelty and murder \u2014 Inadequate legal representation at trial \u2014 Articles 21 and 39-A mandate effective legal aid \u2014 Conviction vitiated, fresh de novo trial ordered \u2014 Right to fair trial upheld.", "Legal Services Authorities Act, 1987": "\u2014 Right to free legal aid \u2014 Constitutional recognition under Article 39-A inserted by the 42nd Amendment \u2014 Enactment ensures no denial of justice due to economic or other disabilities \u2014 Inadequate legal representation vitiates conviction \u2014 Court set aside conviction and directed de novo trial to uphold fair trial guarantee under Article 21 \u2014 Emphasis on competent counsel at every stage and prompt disposal of proceedings." } }, "summary": { "formatted_summary": "The appellant was tried for offences encompassing cruelty, dowry demands, and murder after his wife succumbed to her injuries. He was convicted on 15.05.2024 by the I Additional Sessions Judge, Warangal, but contested the verdict on the ground that he lacked effective legal counsel and was denied a fair trial. Multiple Supreme Court and High Court rulings are cited to emphasize the right to legal aid, reflecting constitutional safeguards under Article 21 and Article 39-A. After examining the arguments of both parties, the Court set aside the conviction and directed a fresh de novo trial, underscoring the necessity of proper representation, sufficient time for counsel\u2019s preparation, and prompt disposal of the proceedings." } }