{ "metadata": { "analysis_of_arguments": "The appellant maintained that the Commercial Court could validly hear the suit, emphasizing the valuation and general CPC provisions unaltered by the Commercial Courts Act. The respondent argued that clause (xvii) of Section 2(1)(c) places intellectual property disputes under the specialized Commercial Division of the High Court, underscoring legislative intent to streamline IP cases. Both sides debated the operation of the first proviso to Section 7, its impact on specified value requirements, and the possibility of forum manipulation through tailor-made valuations. They also raised the continuing role of Section 12A of the Commercial Courts Act and the new IP Division framework as critical to ensuring proper jurisdiction and timely resolution.", "bench": [ "The Hon\u0027ble Mr. Justice M. SUNDAR", "The Hon\u0027ble Mr. Justice R. SAKTHIVEL" ], "case_number": [ "CMA No. 2335 of 2024", "CMP No. 18553 of 2024" ], "cases_referred": [ "Tractors \u0026 Farm Equipment Limited (TAFE) vs Massey Ferguson Corp. (MFC)", "Vishal Pipes Ltd. vs. Bhavya Pipe Industry (2022 SCC Online Delhi 1730 : (2022) 91 PTC 474)", "Pankaj Ravjibhai Patel Trading as Rakesh Pharmaceuticals (Delhi High Court, order dated 02.11.2023)", "Super Cassettes Industries Pvt. Ltd. v. Goldy Dish Antenna (2016 SCC OnLine Del 4622)", "Padma Sundara Rao (dead) and others vs. State of Tamil Nadu and others (2002) 3 SCC 533", "Herrington v. British Railways Board (1972) 2 WLR 537", "P.M.Swamy Vs. K.Sultan Mohideen (1958 SCC OnLine Mad 22)", "SCG Contracts principle (2019) 12 SCC 210" ], "chunkwise_data": { "chunk_1": { "analysis_of_arguments": "The appellant contends that the Commercial Court had jurisdiction to entertain the suit based on the valuation and nature of the intellectual property dispute. The respondent, having entered appearance on caveat, supports the view that the High Court\u2019s Commercial Division is the correct forum, emphasizing that the subject matter requires direct jurisdiction of the High Court.", "cases_referred": [], "facts": "The plaintiff, Tractors \u0026 Farm Equipment Limited (TAFE), filed a plaint against Massey Ferguson Corp. (MFC) in the Principal Commercial Court at Egmore, Chennai, seeking declarations and injunctive reliefs concerning disputed trademarks. The Commercial Court returned the plaint on 16.08.2024, indicating that it should be filed in the Commercial Division of the High Court. Aggrieved by this decision, TAFE filed the present Civil Miscellaneous Appeal in the High Court on 21.08.2024. The matter arises from a commercial dispute regarding trademark rights and their alleged abandonment or interference, and it is now before the Commercial Appellate Division for consideration of the return order.", "final_status": "Pending at the admission stage before the Commercial Appellate Division.", "formatted_summary": "The dispute involves TAFE\u2019s suit against MFC over trademark rights, filed in the Principal Commercial Court, which was returned for want of jurisdiction. TAFE appealed this return order, contending that the Commercial Court could hear the matter. The High Court\u2019s Commercial Appellate Division is examining whether the Commercial Court\u2019s decision to return the plaint was correct and if the dispute falls under its exclusive original jurisdiction, with no final outcome reached yet.", "held": "No final decision is indicated in the excerpt; the High Court has yet to render a determination on the return of the plaint or the merits of the underlying dispute.", "latin_principles": {}, "legal_issues": "Whether the Principal Commercial Court was the proper forum for the trademark dispute or if jurisdiction properly lies with the High Court\u2019s Commercial Division, and whether returning the plaint under Order VII Rule 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure was justified.", "statutes": { "Code of Civil Procedure, 1908": "2.To be noted, above referred \u0027Principal Commercial Court at Egmore, Chennai,\u0027 shall hereinafter be referred to as \u0027said Commercial Court\u0027 and above referred 16.08.2024 order, wherein and whereby a plaint was returned, inter alia by taking recourse to Order VII Rule 10 of \u0027the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908\u0027 (hereinafter referred to as \u0027CPC\u0027 for the sake of brevity, clarity and convenience) shall hereinafter be referred to as \u0027impugned order\u0027 for the sake of convenience and clarity.", "Commercial Courts Act, 2015": "Civil Miscellaneneous Appeal filed under Section 13 of the Commercial Courts Act, 2015 read with Order XLIII Rule 1(A) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, challenging the order dated 16.08.2024 passed by the Principal Commercial Court, Egmore, Chennai in C.O.S.Sr.No.464 of 2024." } }, "chunk_10": { "analysis_of_arguments": "The appellant argued that returning the plaint caused undue hardship and procedural delays. The respondent maintained that the Commercial Court\u2019s order was proper, citing jurisdictional and fairness concerns, and emphasizing that litigants should not select forums through strategic valuations. Both sides addressed the potential for forum shopping and the need to adhere to the established commercial court framework.", "cases_referred": [ "SCG Contracts principle (2019) 12 SCC 210" ], "facts": "The appellant filed a suit involving an intellectual property dispute before the Commercial Court. The Commercial Court returned the plaint, directing presentation in the Commercial Division of the High Court, citing that the latter had proper jurisdiction. Aggrieved, the appellant filed the present appeal against that return order. Prior to this appeal, the case was heard by the Commercial Court, which concluded that the nature of the claims required proceedings in the Commercial Division instead, prompting the appellant\u2019s challenge before this Court.", "final_status": "Dismissed", "formatted_summary": "This appeal arose from the Commercial Court\u2019s return of a plaint in an IPR dispute for presentation in the Commercial Division of the High Court, prompted by concerns over forum selection and jurisdiction. The High Court dismissed the appeal, agreeing that IPR matters must be pursued in the proper commercial forum. The Court emphasized avoiding forum shopping and maintaining the procedural discipline of commercial litigation. References to the Commercial Courts Act, sections 6, 7, and 12-A, and Order VII Rule 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure informed the Court\u2019s reasoning. Ultimately, the dismissal reaffirms the jurisdictional boundaries between the commercial court and commercial division.", "held": "The Court upheld the Commercial Court\u2019s order returning the plaint for presentation before the Commercial Division, holding that it was the correct forum given the nature of the dispute. The decision underscores the court\u2019s commitment to curbing forum shopping and ensuring that commercial and IPR matters are adjudicated in the proper forum. This ruling may guide similar cases involving disputed commercial court and commercial division jurisdictions.", "latin_principles": { "ad valorem": "as regards injunctive reliefs, notional valuation is possible and similar / same kind of suits can be presented either in the Commercial Court or in the Commercial Division by a plaintiff by reducing or increasing the valuation which is neither ad valorem nor fixed as regards injunctive reliefs are concerned. This again is not a desirable situation and therefore, we find the impugned order to be correct and appropriate in addressing this issue." }, "legal_issues": "Whether the Commercial Court correctly returned the plaint for filing in the Commercial Division, and whether such a return order prevented potential forum shopping in IPR suits and complied with required procedures under the commercial litigation regime.", "statutes": { "Commercial Courts Act, 2015 (Section 12-A)": "(f) Lastly, we find that no prejudice has been caused to the appellant by the impugned order as the appellant can proceed with the same suit in the Commercial Division (subject of course Section 12-A point which may come up for consideration, which in any event would fall for consideration in Commercial Court also).", "Commercial Courts Act, 2015 (Sections 6 and 7)": "the timeline under CCA. As an illustration in such a IPR suit, defendant can file written statement well after 30 days + 90 days, i.e., 120 days, give a goby to SCG Contracts principle reported in (2019) 12 SCC 210 and seek condonation of delay and this will apply to all other timelines under CCA. If IPR litigations are to be delayed enlessly by resorting to this, it would run counter productive to the very objective of CCA. Whether there should be a proviso to section 6 akin to the first proviso to section 7 is a larger question which in our considered opinion may be outside our remit, i.e., outside the legal perimeter within which the legal drill on hand should perumbulate. Therefore, we are not treading into that arena and we are leaving that question open. Suffice to say that as regards the case on hand and the Madras High Court (rest of Tamil Nadu), as there is no proviso to section 6 which is akin to the first proviso to section 7 would lead to a situation where a sizeable chunk of IPR litigations go before the regular court and not the Commercial Court. This will be a anethema to the sublime philosophy underlining CCA and salutary principle guiding CCA. Therefore, we have no hesitation whatsoever in 37/41 https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis C.M.A. No.2335 of 2024 saying that said Commercial Court was correct in its approach in returning the plaint (by referring to Order VII Rule 10 of CPC for being presented in the Commercial Division of this Court).", "The Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (Order VII Rule 10)": "saying that said Commercial Court was correct in its approach in returning the plaint (by referring to Order VII Rule 10 of CPC for being presented in the Commercial Division of this Court)." } }, "chunk_11": { "analysis_of_arguments": "No arguments or perspectives of the parties are discussed in the provided text.", "cases_referred": [], "facts": "The text references an appeal numbered C.M.A. No.2335 of 2024, dated 27.08.2024, but no factual details about the dispute, parties, or events leading to the case are provided. No procedural history is available in the provided text.", "final_status": "No information regarding the outcome or status of the case is provided.", "formatted_summary": "The provided text only shows the case number, date, and a reference to the High Court\u2019s website link, without any substantive legal or factual content.", "held": "There is no mention of any decision or holding in the document.", "latin_principles": {}, "legal_issues": "The document does not set out any legal issues to be determined.", "statutes": {} }, "chunk_2": { "analysis_of_arguments": "The appellant submits that the Commercial Courts Act is a special enactment that overrides the Code of Civil Procedure where there is a conflict, emphasizing that key definitions and statutory provisions in the Act limit the Commercial Court\u2019s use of unamended CPC provisions. The respondent contends that certain provisions of the Act incorporate definitions from the CPC, thereby validating the Commercial Court\u2019s reliance on the Code to return the plaint. Both sides discuss the correct forum for filing the plaint and the interplay between the Commercial Division and Commercial Court jurisdictions.", "cases_referred": [], "facts": "TAFE filed a plaint before the Commercial Court, which returned the plaint by invoking Order VII Rule 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure, citing that it should have been filed in the Commercial Division instead. Aggrieved by this decision, TAFE preferred the present appeal before this Commercial Appellate Division (CAD). Counsel for both TAFE and MFC appeared and, when the matter was listed on the Admission Board, agreed to proceed on the main appeal. Procedurally, notice was issued, and the parties consented to argue the matter in full without calling for trial records, as no post-trial verdict was involved. The question regarding Section 12A of the Commercial Courts Act was mentioned but left open for a future determination.", "final_status": "The matter has been heard in detail on the main appeal and stands reserved for judgment.", "formatted_summary": "This section addresses the correctness of returning the plaint by the Commercial Court under Order VII Rule 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure and whether the matter should have been instituted in the Commercial Division. Both TAFE and MFC advanced arguments focusing on the interplay between the Commercial Courts Act and the Code of Civil Procedure. The court heard the appeal in full without summoning records, reserved its decision on the final outcome, and left open the question concerning Section 12A of the Commercial Courts Act.", "held": "No final pronouncement is recorded in this excerpt; the court\u2019s decision on the correctness of returning the plaint and on the application of the Commercial Courts Act is awaited.", "latin_principles": { "qua": "Paragraph 7: This CAD is of the view that it is not necessary to dilate more on facts qua averments in the plaint, considering the limited legal perimeter..." }, "legal_issues": "Whether the Commercial Court was correct in returning the plaint under Order VII Rule 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure on the ground that it should have been filed in the Commercial Division, and whether the Commercial Courts Act prevails over the Code of Civil Procedure with respect to jurisdictional and procedural matters.", "statutes": { "Code of Civil Procedure": "7.This CAD is of the view that it is not necessary to dilate more on facts qua averments in the plaint, considering the limited legal perimeter within which legal drill at hand in captioned CAD appeal should perambulate. In other words or to put it differently, this CAD is now concerned with the question as to \u0027whether the impugned order made by said Commercial Court returning the plaint by taking recourse to Order VII Rule 10 of CPC is correct?\u0027 and the more pointed question as to \u0027whether the plaint ought to have been presented only in the Commercial Division and not in the Commercial Court, much less said Commercial Court?\u0027 is the short point that arises for consideration. Therefore, as observed supra, it is unnecessary to dilate on the plaint averments as regards facts any further.\n\n13.1.It was argued by learned Senior Counsel for appellant that said Commercial Court ought not to have looked at CPC. This submission was made in the light of reference to Section 2(4) of CPC (definition of \u0027district\u0027 in the impugned order) by said Commecial court in the impugned order. To be noted, there is also a reference to \u0027District Court\u0027 within paranthesis in the definition of \u0027district\u0027 vide Section 2(4) of CPC. In this regard, to buttress this submission, it was submitted that CCA is (i) a special Act, (ii) a self-contained Code and (iii) it excludes all other statutes and Codes which run into it (Section 21 which deals with overriding effect of CCA). Interestingly, it was also submitted that CCA is partly substantive and partly procedural. We leave open the question as to whether CCA is partly substantive/partly procedural law or wholly procedural law as that is really not imperative to be part of dispositive reasoning for returning a verdict in the legal drill at hand.\nIn this regard, learned Senior Counsel for MFC drew our attention to sub section (2) of Section 2 of CCA. A careful perusal of the scheme of the statute, i.e., scheme of CCA, definition clause, sub section (2) of Section 2, makes it clear in categoric terms that the words and expressions used but not defined in CCA shall have the same meaning as assigned to them in CPC if the same are defined in CPC. We also looked at sub section (3) of Section 16. We make it clear that Section 16 read with Schedule is the soul of CCA and a careful perusal of CCA which talks about amendments to CPC in its applicability to commercial disputes makes it clear that when any rule of the jurisdictional High Court or any amendment to CPC by the State Government is in conflict with the provisions of CPC as amended by CCA, the provisions of CPC, as amended by CCA, will prevail. The scheme of the statue makes it clear that when it comes to commercial disputes and a trial in a Commercial Court, CPC, as amended by CCA will apply as regards those provisions of CPC which are amended by CCA. It is axiomatic and the inevitable corollary is, those of the provisions of CPC which have not been amended by CCA will", "Commercial Courts Act": "11. We find that an application for dispensing with Section 12A of CCA has been filed but as that would be outside the perimeter within which the legal drill at hand should perambulate, we leave that question open but we make it clear that we shall consider that question in another matter where it becomes imperative to return a verdict.\n\n13.1.It was argued by learned Senior Counsel for appellant that said Commercial Court ought not to have looked at CPC. This submission was made in the light of reference to Section 2(4) of CPC (definition of \u0027district\u0027 in the impugned order) by said Commecial court in the impugned order. To be noted, there is also a reference to \u0027District Court\u0027 within paranthesis in the definition of \u0027district\u0027 vide Section 2(4) of CPC. In this regard, to buttress this submission, it was submitted that CCA is (i) a special Act, (ii) a self-contained Code and (iii) it excludes all other statutes and Codes which run into it (Section 21 which deals with overriding effect of CCA). Interestingly, it was also submitted that CCA is partly substantive and partly procedural. We leave open the question as to whether CCA is partly substantive/partly procedural law or wholly procedural law as that is really not imperative to be part of dispositive reasoning for returning a verdict in the legal drill at hand.\nIn this regard, learned Senior Counsel for MFC drew our attention to sub section (2) of Section 2 of CCA. A careful perusal of the scheme of the statute, i.e., scheme of CCA, definition clause, sub section (2) of Section 2, makes it clear in categoric terms that the words and expressions used but not defined in CCA shall have the same meaning as assigned to them in CPC if the same are defined in CPC. We also looked at sub section (3) of Section 16. We make it clear that Section 16 read with Schedule is the soul of CCA and a careful perusal of CCA which talks about amendments to CPC in its applicability to commercial disputes makes it clear that when any rule of the jurisdictional High Court or any amendment to CPC by the State Government is in conflict with the provisions of CPC as amended by CCA, the provisions of CPC, as amended by CCA, will prevail. The scheme of the statue makes it clear that when it comes to commercial disputes and a trial in a Commercial Court, CPC, as amended by CCA will apply as regards those provisions of CPC which are amended by CCA. It is axiomatic and the inevitable corollary is, those of the provisions of CPC which have not been amended by CCA will" } }, "chunk_3": { "analysis_of_arguments": "Appellant contends that the Commercial Court improperly looked to CPC for defining \u2018District Judge\u2019 given CCA\u2019s own definition. The respondent, however, maintains there is no conflict, emphasizing that only amended parts of the CPC are superseded by the CCA, and that CPC provisions remain applicable wherever not expressly amended. The appellant also argues that the first proviso to Section 7 segregates jurisdiction based on the monetary valuation of the suit, while the respondent counters that CCA provisions must be read harmoniously with the CPC.", "cases_referred": [], "facts": "The dispute arises from a commercial plaint (C.O.S.SR. No.464 of 2024) that was filed before a Commercial Court and subsequently returned by an impugned order. The appellant then preferred C.M.A. No.2335 of 2024, challenging that return. The controversy centers on whether the Commercial Court properly relied on definitions in the Code of Civil Procedure (CPC) and whether certain provisions of the Commercial Courts Act (CCA) preclude such reliance. The procedural posture involves an appeal against the order returning the plaint, with questions about the court\u2019s pecuniary jurisdiction also coming to the fore.", "final_status": "Not indicated in the provided text", "formatted_summary": "This section of the document discusses a pending commercial appeal (C.M.A. No.2335 of 2024) arising from a returned plaint in a commercial dispute. Central to the dispute is the interplay between the Commercial Courts Act (CCA) and the Code of Civil Procedure (CPC), particularly regarding definitions and the applicable amendments when a commercial suit is valued below or above a certain threshold. The court notes there is no conflict in referencing CPC definitions, holds that unamended parts of the CPC remain in full effect for commercial proceedings, and that the Commercial Court did not err in looking to the CPC for jurisdictional guidance.", "held": "The court found no error in relying on Section 2(4) of the CPC, ruling that there is no conflict between the definitions in the CCA and CPC. Further substantive conclusions on other issues were not provided in the available text.", "latin_principles": {}, "legal_issues": "Whether the Commercial Court lawfully invoked Section 2(4) of the CPC despite the CCA defining \u2018District Judge\u2019 separately; the scope and applicability of provisions of CPC, as amended by the CCA, for commercial disputes; and the role of the first proviso to Section 7 of the CCA regarding pecuniary jurisdiction.", "statutes": { "Code of Civil Procedure (CPC)": "CPC consists of 158 Sections, LI Orders vide Schedule I to CPC (in terms of 1 to 158 and Order I to Order LI but the actual number of Sections may be more/less, taking into account the alpha series in certain Sections besides insertions and deletions) and 8 Appendices to Schedule I, viz., A to H. The CCA, vide Section 16 and Schedule thereto, which we have described as the soul of CCA, amends three of the 158 Sections, 10 of the LI Orders and adds one Appendix, viz., Appendix I to the existing 8 Appendices, viz., Appendices A to H.", "Commercial Courts Act (CCA)": "In this regard, learned Senior Counsel for MFC drew our attention to sub section (2) of Section 2 of CCA. A careful perusal of the scheme of the statute, i.e., scheme of CCA, definition clause, sub section (2) of Section 2, makes it clear in categoric terms that the words and expressions used but not defined in CCA shall have the same meaning as assigned to them in CPC if the same are defined in CPC. We also looked at sub section (3) of Section 16. We make it clear that Section 16 read with Schedule is the soul of CCA", "Constitution of India": "We carefully perused the definition of the expression \u0027District Judge\u0027 vide Section 2(1)(e) of CCA. We find that the definition of Section 2(1)(e) runs as follows: \u00272Definitions: (1) In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires, -- (a).... (b).... (c).... (d)..... (e)\u201cDistrict Judge\u201d shall have the same meaning as assigned to it in clause (a) of Article 236 of the Constitution of India;\u0027 Article 236(a) is neatly slotted in Chapter VI of Part VI of the Constitution. Part VI is captioned \u0027the States\u0027 and Chapter VI thereat is captioned \u0027Subordinate Courts\u0027. Article 236(a) refers to District Judge in that" } }, "chunk_4": { "analysis_of_arguments": "The appellant argues that the language \u0027filed or pending\u0027 in the first proviso to Section 7 pertains solely to cases instituted prior to the coming into force of the Commercial Courts Act, and that the legislature, by using phrases such as \u0027shall be filed\u0027 in other sections, intended a different application. The respondent contends that the omission of explicit prospective wording in the first proviso suggests it includes both pending and future matters, indicating that the Safeguard \u0027Specified Value\u0027 does not restrict the Commercial Division\u2019s jurisdiction under that proviso.", "cases_referred": [], "facts": "The dispute arises from a question of whether a commercial suit, particularly involving intellectual property rights, should be adjudicated by the Commercial Court or the Commercial Division of the High Court, depending on the pecuniary value of the claim. The appellant challenges an order regarding the proper forum under the Commercial Courts Act. The case is now heard in C.M.A. No.2335 of 2024, with both parties focusing on the interpretation of statutory provisions relating to the jurisdiction of courts based on the suit\u2019s valuation. The matter has proceeded to appellate review after the impugned order was issued at the trial level.", "final_status": "No final status indicated.", "formatted_summary": "This passage involves a jurisdictional debate regarding which forum\u2014the Commercial Division of the High Court or the Commercial Court\u2014should hear a commercial dispute concerning intellectual property rights with a specific monetary value. The parties dispute whether the first proviso to Section 7 of the Commercial Courts Act applies only to pre-existing cases or also to future suits, emphasizing the statutory phrasing \u0027filed or pending.\u0027 The discussion also covers the role of \u0027Specified Value\u0027 in conferring jurisdiction. The court analyzes various sections of the Commercial Courts Act, along with references to the Designs Act, Patents Act, and Arbitration and Conciliation Act, but no final outcome is stated.", "held": "No conclusive holding is provided in the excerpt. The court is still evaluating the applicability of the first proviso to Section 7 of the Commercial Courts Act to resolve the jurisdictional dispute.", "latin_principles": {}, "legal_issues": "Whether the first proviso to Section 7 of the Commercial Courts Act applies prospectively or only to suits filed before its commencement, how the references to \u0027filed or pending\u0027 should be interpreted, and whether the lack of a \u0027Specified Value\u0027 requirement in that proviso permits the Commercial Division to entertain suits below a certain monetary threshold.", "statutes": { "Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (26 of 1996)": "\u201cIf such arbitration is other than an international commercial arbitration, all applications or appeals arising out of such arbitration under the provisions of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (26 of 1996) ... shall be filed in, and heard and disposed of by the Commercial Court exercising territorial jurisdiction over such arbitration where such Commercial Court has been constituted.\u201d", "Commercial Courts Act, 2015 - Section 10": "\u201cSection 10 deals with jurisdiction in respect of arbitration matters and sub section (3) thereat reads as follows: \u002710Jurisdiction in respect of arbitration matters.-- Where the subject matter of an arbitration is a commercial dispute of a specified value and -- (3)If such arbitration is other than an international commercial arbitration, all applications or appeals arising out of such arbitration under the provisions of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (26 of 1996) that would ordinarily lie before any Principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction in a district (not being a High Court) shall be filed in, and heard and disposed of by the Commercial Court exercising territorial jurisdiction...\u0027\u201d", "Commercial Courts Act, 2015 - Section 2(1)(c)(xvii)": "\u201cjurisdiction qua commercial disputes vide Section 2(1)(c)(xvii) of CCA but are segregated by pecuniary jurisdiction. In other words or to put it in simple terms, the argument is, those of IPR suits vide Section 2(1)(c)(xvii) of CCA where a plaint is valued Rs.1 crore or less would go to the Commercial Court and those valued at Rs.1 crore or more would only come to the Commercial Division {to be noted, the pecuniary jurisdiction of Original Side of Madras High Court is above Rs.1 Crore}.\u201d", "Commercial Courts Act, 2015 - Section 7": "\u201c13.3 This takes us to another facet of the appellant\u2019s campaign against the impugned order, i.e., the third point. This facet turns on the first proviso to Section 7 of CCA. Before proceeding further, we deem it appropriate to extract and reproduce Section 7 of CCA along with two provisos, which read as follows: \u00277.Jurisdiction of Commercial Divisions of High Courts.-- All suits and applications relating to commercial disputes of a Specific Value filed in a High Court having ordinary original civil jurisdiction shall be heard and disposed of by the Commercial Division of that High Court: Provided that all suits and applications relating to commercial disputes, stipulated by an Act to lie in a Court not inferior to a District Court, and filed or pending on the original side of the High Court, shall be heard and disposed of by the Commercial Division of the High Court...\u0027\u201d", "Designs Act, 2000 (16 of 2000)": "\u201cProvided further that all suits and applications transferred to the High Court by virtue of sub-section (4) of Section 22 of the Designs Act, 2000 (16 of 2000) ... shall be heard and disposed of by the Commercial Division of the High Court in all the areas over which the High Court exercises ordinary original civil jurisdiction.\u201d", "Patents Act, 1970 (39 of 1970)": "\u201cProvided further that all suits and applications transferred to the High Court by virtue of ... Section 104 of the Patents Act, 1970 (39 of 1970) shall be heard and disposed of by the Commercial Division of the High Court in all the areas over which the High Court exercises ordinary original civil jurisdiction.\u201d" } }, "chunk_5": { "analysis_of_arguments": "One position holds that the first proviso to Section 7 is specifically designed to extend Commercial Division jurisdiction to intellectual property suits, irrespective of specified value, if the IP statute mandates filing in a District Court or higher. Another position questions whether that proviso can be read into Section 6 or if it should remain limited only to IP suits, with parties citing conflicting views from earlier Delhi High Court rulings citing Vishal Pipes and Pankaj Ravjibhai Patel Trading.", "cases_referred": [ "Vishal Pipes Ltd. vs. Bhavya Pipe Industry (2022 SCC Online Delhi 1730 : (2022) 91 PTC 474)", "Pankaj Ravjibhai Patel Trading as Rakesh Pharmaceuticals (Delhi High Court, order dated 02.11.2023)" ], "facts": "The excerpt does not describe a specific factual dispute or lower court proceedings. It is an appellate matter identified as C.M.A. No.2335 of 2024, but the text focuses exclusively on interpreting the Commercial Courts Act, particularly regarding admiralty issues, insurance matters, and suits pertaining to intellectual property rights rather than setting out a factual scenario or procedural history.", "final_status": "No final status is described in the excerpt.", "formatted_summary": "This portion of the judgment addresses how certain categories of commercial disputes, particularly intellectual property suits, are handled under the Commercial Courts Act. The court explains that admiralty cases lie within the jurisdiction of the High Court and that the first proviso to Section 7 is intended to ensure IP disputes proceed in the Commercial Division, regardless of specified value, if the relevant IP statute requires suing in at least the District Court. The excerpt contrasts different Delhi High Court decisions (Vishal Pipes and Pankaj Ravjibhai Patel Trading) and clarifies that the exception under Section 7 does not extend to Section 6.", "held": "The court concluded that Section 7\u2019s first proviso is a distinct provision applying to IP disputes set out in Section 2(1)(c)(xvii) of the Commercial Courts Act, ensuring that such suits fall within the Commercial Division\u2019s domain regardless of specified value. It clarified that no similar proviso exists under Section 6 for other commercial disputes.", "latin_principles": {}, "legal_issues": "The central questions involve whether certain suits under intellectual property laws or admiralty/maritime matters can be brought before the Commercial Division even if they do not meet the specified value requirement, and whether the first proviso to Section 7 of the Commercial Courts Act is a unique exception that overrides Section 6\u2019s specified value condition for IP disputes.", "statutes": { "Commercial Courts Act, 2015": "\u201cThis means that this takes this discussion to an arena where we notice that there is no similar proviso to Section 6 of CCA. There are no provisos at all to Section 6. The sequitur is, as regards Section 6 captioned \u2018Jurisdiction of Commercial Court\u2019, only those matters which satisfy the twin conditions of being a \u2018commercial dispute\u2019 under Section 2(1)(c), i.e., one of the 21 categories and of \u2018Specified Value\u2019 vide Section 2(1)(i) read with Section 12 of CCA, will qualify to be heard by Commercial Court, whereas, in the light of language in which the first proviso to Section 7 is couched, even those of the matters which are commercial disputes but not of Specified Value will qualify, provided a statute stipulates or makes it clear that the suit will lie in a Court which is not inferior to a District Court.\u201d", "The Copyright Act, 1957": "\u201cIn this regard, we make it clear that all the legislations or Acts which fall under the basket of Intellectual Property Rights, viz., the Trademarks Act, 1999, the Copyright Act, 1957, the Designs Act, 2000, the Patents Act, 1970, the Geographical Indications of Goods (Registration and Protection) Act, 1999 and the Protection of Plant Variety and Farmers\u2019 Rights Act, 2001, have a provision which says that suit will not lie to a Court inferior to that of a District Court. \u2026 3 The Copyright Act, 1957 S.62 \u2026\u201d", "The Designs Act, 2000": "\u201cIn this regard, we make it clear that all the legislations or Acts which fall under the basket of Intellectual Property Rights, viz., the Trademarks Act, 1999, the Copyright Act, 1957, the Designs Act, 2000, the Patents Act, 1970, the Geographical Indications of Goods (Registration and Protection) Act, 1999 and the Protection of Plant Variety and Farmers\u2019 Rights Act, 2001, have a provision which says that suit will not lie to a Court inferior to that of a District Court. \u2026 4 The Designs Act, 2000 S.22 \u2026\u201d", "The Geographical Indications of Goods (Registration and Protection) Act, 1999": "\u201cIn this regard, we make it clear that all the legislations or Acts which fall under the basket of Intellectual Property Rights, viz., the Trademarks Act, 1999, the Copyright Act, 1957, the Designs Act, 2000, the Patents Act, 1970, the Geographical Indications of Goods (Registration and Protection) Act, 1999 and the Protection of Plant Variety and Farmers\u2019 Rights Act, 2001, have a provision which says that suit will not lie to a Court inferior to that of a District Court. \u2026 5 The Geographical Indications of Goods (Registration and Protection) Act, 1999 Ss.66 and 73 \u2026\u201d", "The Patents Act, 1970": "\u201cIn this regard, we make it clear that all the legislations or Acts which fall under the basket of Intellectual Property Rights, viz., the Trademarks Act, 1999, the Copyright Act, 1957, the Designs Act, 2000, the Patents Act, 1970, the Geographical Indications of Goods (Registration and Protection) Act, 1999 and the Protection of Plant Variety and Farmers\u2019 Rights Act, 2001, have a provision which says that suit will not lie to a Court inferior to that of a District Court. \u2026 2 The Patents Act, 1970 S.104 \u2026\u201d", "The Protection of Plant Variety and Farmers\u0027 Rights Act, 2001": "\u201cIn this regard, we make it clear that all the legislations or Acts which fall under the basket of Intellectual Property Rights, viz., the Trademarks Act, 1999, the Copyright Act, 1957, the Designs Act, 2000, the Patents Act, 1970, the Geographical Indications of Goods (Registration and Protection) Act, 1999 and the Protection of Plant Variety and Farmers\u2019 Rights Act, 2001, have a provision which says that suit will not lie to a Court inferior to that of a District Court. \u2026 6 The Protection of Plant Variety and Farmers\u2019 Rights Act, 2001 S.65 \u2026\u201d", "The Trademarks Act, 1999": "\u201cIn this regard, we make it clear that all the legislations or Acts which fall under the basket of Intellectual Property Rights, viz., the Trademarks Act, 1999, the Copyright Act, 1957, the Designs Act, 2000, the Patents Act, 1970, the Geographical Indications of Goods (Registration and Protection) Act, 1999 and the Protection of Plant Variety and Farmers\u2019 Rights Act, 2001, have a provision which says that suit will not lie to a Court inferior to that of a District Court. For the sake of ease of reference, the provisions in these six enactments as per which a suit will not lie to a Court inferior to that of a District Court, are set out in the following tabular column: \u2026 1 The Trademarks Act, 1999 Ss. 134 and 142 \u2026\u201d" } }, "chunk_6": { "analysis_of_arguments": "The appellant maintains that Commercial Courts and the Commercial Division are separated primarily by the suit\u2019s pecuniary value and that lower valuations should not go before the Commercial Division. The opposing side contends that IPR suits are carved out as a distinct category, rendering the pecuniary threshold analysis inapplicable when deciding jurisdiction under the first proviso to Section 7. Further, comparisons to prior cases like \u0027Super Cassettes\u0027 are argued to be inapposite owing to differing factual settings.", "cases_referred": [ "Vishal Pipes", "Pankaj Ravjibhai Patel Trading", "Super Cassettes Industries Pvt. Ltd. v. Goldy Dish Antenna (2016 SCC OnLine Del 4622)", "Padma Sundara Rao (dead) and others vs. State of Tamil Nadu and others (2002) 3 SCC 533", "Herrington v. British Railways Board (1972) 2 WLR 537" ], "facts": "The present matter arises out of a dispute concerning whether certain suits, particularly in the realm of intellectual property, should be heard by the Commercial Division or the Commercial Court. An appeal was taken against a prior determination, and references were made to decisions from other High Courts, including those titled \u2018Vishal Pipes\u2019 and \u2018Pankaj Ravjibhai Patel Trading,\u2019 as well as a decision in \u2018Super Cassettes.\u2019 Procedurally, this is at the appellate stage (C.M.A. No.2335 of 2024), where the court is examining the earlier rulings and the question of forum based on the nature and valuation of the suits.", "final_status": "The matter remains pending, with no final disposal indicated in the excerpt.", "formatted_summary": "The excerpt deals with an appellate proceeding questioning which forum\u2014Commercial Court or Commercial Division\u2014has jurisdiction to hear a particular suit, specifically addressing IPR suits and their exemption from the usual pecuniary thresholds. Previous rulings, including \u2018Vishal Pipes,\u2019 \u2018Pankaj Ravjibhai Patel Trading,\u2019 and \u2018Super Cassettes,\u2019 are cited to illustrate differing positions, and the court notes the first proviso to Section 7 as a uniquely applicable provision for IPR cases, setting them apart from suits determined purely by pecuniary value.", "held": "No conclusive holding is indicated in the provided text. The court emphasizes that IPR suits stand on a distinct footing and that the first proviso to Section 7 uniquely places such suits under the Commercial Division, independent of pecuniary thresholds.", "latin_principles": {}, "legal_issues": "Whether the suit, especially involving IPR matters, falls under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Commercial Division regardless of pecuniary thresholds, and whether the classification between Commercial Courts and the Commercial Division holds for low-valued suits.", "statutes": { "Commercial Courts Act": "With regard to the second point argued on the appellant\u0027s side that the Commercial Courts and the Commercial Division are segregated only by pecuniary value, we are of the view that dispositive reasoning qua the first proviso to Section 7 makes the position clear that one out of 21 categories adumbrated under Section 2(1)(c) of CCA, only one clause [clause (xvii)] has been carved out for being heard exclusively by Commercial Division {irrespetive of specified value} (in five High Courts) and therefore, the argument that the jurisdictions of Commercial Courts and Commercial Division are segregated by pecuniary jurisdiction does not hold water when it comes to Section 2(1)(c)(xvii) of CCA, i.e., IPR suits.", "Land Acquisition Act": "In this regard, we find that Super Cassettes is clearly distinguishable on facts and we remind ourselves of the declaration of law made in Padma Sundara Rao (dead) and others vs. State of Tamil Nadu and others [(2002) 3 SCC 533] in which the factual matrix was the question as to whether on a Section 4 notice under the Land Acquisition Act being quashed, the State gets a fresh period of time to make the Section 6 declaration. Hon\u0027ble Supreme Court wrote that every precedent / case law has to be relied based on the facts obtaining therein ..." } }, "chunk_7": { "analysis_of_arguments": "One side contended that comparing the Delhi High Court\u2019s Original Side with that of the Madras High Court is improper, emphasizing differences in territorial and pecuniary jurisdiction. They also argued against relying on a prior \u201cSuper Cassettes\u201d judgment for forum-related determinations. The opposing party maintained that the High Court\u2019s Original Side is higher in the hierarchy than a District Court, insisting that the Commercial Court\u2019s approach, including its application of certain procedural rules, was correct.", "cases_referred": [ "Super Cassettes Judgment", "P.M.Swamy Vs. K.Sultan Mohideen (1958 SCC OnLine Mad 22)" ], "facts": "This appeal, registered as C.M.A. No.2335 of 2024, arises from an order passed by the Commercial Court concerning a dispute over the proper forum for filing intellectual property (IPR) suits. The case involves questions regarding whether such suits should be instituted before the High Court on its Original Side or in a District Court. Prior to this appeal, the Commercial Court had dismissed objections challenging its jurisdiction, prompting the appellant to seek reconsideration before the High Court.", "final_status": "The appeal is dismissed, and the Commercial Court\u2019s order stands upheld.", "formatted_summary": "In C.M.A. No.2335 of 2024, the High Court considered an appeal arising from the Commercial Court\u2019s order on whether IPR suits should be filed on the High Court\u2019s Original Side or in a District Court. The court upheld the Commercial Court\u2019s view that the Original Side of the High Court is above the District Court in the judicial hierarchy and that there was no error in applying unamended procedural provisions. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed.", "held": "The High Court affirmed that the Original Side is superior in judicial hierarchy to a District Court, holding that there was no legal infirmity in the Commercial Court\u2019s decision. The ruling clarifies forum-related questions for future intellectual property litigation.", "latin_principles": { "qua": "Therefore, the expressions \u0027file\u0027 and \u0027lie\u0027 qua a suit necessarily pertain to \u0027presentation of a plaint\u0027 vide Rule 21 of Civil Rules of Practice which is prior to institution of suits.", "vide": "Therefore, the expressions \u0027file\u0027 and \u0027lie\u0027 qua a suit necessarily pertain to \u0027presentation of a plaint\u0027 vide Rule 21 of Civil Rules of Practice which is prior to institution of suits." }, "legal_issues": "Whether the High Court\u2019s Original Side can be equated with a District Court for the purpose of instituting trademark and other IPR suits, and whether the Commercial Court\u2019s reliance on unamended provisions of procedural law was valid.", "statutes": { "the Civil Rules of Practice": "Therefore, the expressions \u0027file\u0027 and \u0027lie\u0027 qua a suit necessarily pertain to \u0027presentation of a plaint\u0027 vide Rule 21 of Civil Rules of Practice which is prior to institution of suits.", "the Code of Civil Procedure": "This CAD, as would be evident from the discussion, has come to the conclusion that all provisions of CPC which are not amended by CCA will apply in full force to a Commercial Court. We buttress this reasoning by pointing out that three [Order XIII Rule 1, Order VII Rule 14 and Order VIII Rule 1-A] provisions of CPC have been made inapplicable to Commercial Courts vide Schedule to CCA which has to be read with Section 16 of CCA. A careful perusal of these provisions which have been made inapplicable will make it clear that these provisions are such that they are either in an overlap or conflict with unamended provisions of CPC or do not fit into the CCA timelines. This CAD having buttressed this dispositive reasoning, has no hesitation in writing that said Commercial Court cannot be found fault with for having relied on Section 2(4) of CPC or for that matter other provisions of unamended CPC.", "the Commercial Courts Act, 2015": "We also find that in first proviso to Section 7 of CCA, the words used are \u0027file\u0027 and \u0027lie\u0027. We carefully perused P. Ramanatha Aiyar\u0027s Law Lexicon on the said two words. The word \u0027file\u0027 means \u0027to deposit with the proper custodian for keeping; to place in the official custody of the clerk; to put upon the files or among the records of a Court.\u0027 The word \u0027lie\u0027 means \u0027to subsist; to exist;\u0027 To be noted, these two meanings are the most relevant. Therefore, the expressions \u0027file\u0027 and \u0027lie\u0027 qua a suit necessarily pertain to \u0027presentation of a plaint\u0027 vide Rule 21 of Civil Rules of Practice which is prior to institution of suits.", "the Trade Marks Act, 1999": "the High Court (Original Side) is not a District Court. A straightforward answer to this lies in the language in which Section 134(1) of \u0027the Trade Marks Act, 1999\u0027 [\u0027TM Act 1999\u0027 for the sake of convenience] is couched. Section 134(1) of TM Act 1999 makes it clear that a suit shall not be instituted in any Court inferior to a District Court having jurisdiction, meaning, as long as there is territorial jurisdiction, a Court which is not inferior i.e., below the District Court in the \u0027hierarchy of Courts\u0027 (cannotation) as we understand the expression \u0027inferior\u0027 cannot be approached. High Court (Original Side) is obviously above the District Court in the hierarchy of Courts and therefore, this does not present a problem." } }, "chunk_8": { "analysis_of_arguments": "The appellant contends that the Commercial Court is competent to hear the dispute, emphasizing that the proceedings were validly instituted there. The respondent asserts that longstanding practices and specific provisions on jurisdiction mandate that all IPR suits must be adjudicated at the High Court\u2019s Original Side, rendering the Commercial Court an inappropriate forum.", "cases_referred": [ "P.M.Swamy Vs. K.Sultan Mohideen reported in 1958 SCC OnLine Mad 22" ], "facts": "The dispute arises from a civil miscellaneous appeal challenging an order of the Commercial Court, where an intellectual property rights suit was initially filed. The Commercial Court concluded that it lacked jurisdiction to entertain the matter, noting that IPR suits traditionally fall within the Original Side jurisdiction of the Madras High Court. Aggrieved by this outcome, the appellant pursued the present appeal. Prior to reaching this stage, the appellant sought to establish that the Commercial Court had jurisdiction, but that plea was rejected at the first instance, prompting the current appellate proceedings.", "final_status": "The appeal is dismissed.", "formatted_summary": "In this appeal, the appellant challenged a Commercial Court\u2019s decision declining jurisdiction in an intellectual property dispute, pointing to the longstanding convention that IPR cases are tried on the Original Side of the Madras High Court. After reviewing the matter, the High Court found no error in the Commercial Court\u2019s conclusion, stressing that established rules and customary practice require such suits to be adjudicated under the High Court\u2019s Original Civil Jurisdiction. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed, reinforcing that IPR suits fall within the scope of the Commercial Division of the High Court rather than the Commercial Court.", "held": "The High Court upheld the Commercial Court\u2019s view that IPR suits are to be instituted on the Original Side of the Madras High Court, affirming that no error was committed. The decision clarifies the established procedure for similar future disputes, reinforcing the original civil jurisdiction of the High Court over such matters.", "latin_principles": {}, "legal_issues": "Whether the Commercial Court has jurisdiction to hear an intellectual property rights suit that, by established practice and under relevant legal provisions, is ordinarily filed and tried on the Original Side of the Madras High Court.", "statutes": { "Chennai City Civil Court Act, 1892": "The Chennai City Civil Court Act, 1892 [hereinafter \u0027CCC Act\u0027 for the sake of convenience] is of relevance, Section 16 of CCC Act clearly says the power of High Court and the same reads as follows: \u002716.Saving of original civil jurisdiction of High Court.-- Nothing in this Act contained shall affect the original civil jurisdiction of the High Court: Provided that -- (1)if any suit or other proceedings is instituted in the High Court which, in the opinion of the Judge who tries the same (whose opinion shall be final), ought to have been instituted in the City Court, no costs shall be allowed to a successful plaintiff... (2)in any suit or other proceedings pending at any time in the High Court and Judge of such Court may at any stage thereof make an order transferring the same to the City Court... (3)in any suit or other proceedings so transferred, the Court-fees Act, 1870 (Central Act VII of 1870) shall apply...\u0027", "Code of Civil Procedure": "C.M.A. No.2335 of 2024 impugned order of the said Commercial Court much less any illegality warranting interference in terms of relying on CPC provisions.", "Commercial Courts Act": "(c)We have set out in detail the scope of the first proviso to Section 7 of CCA. The said Commercial Court has also hinged the impugned judgment strongly (not solely) on this first proviso to section 7 of CCA. In addition to our dispositive reasoning supra that this first proviso to section 7 of CCA would apply to fresh cases to be filed and not to the pending cases, we add that the expression \u0027filed or pending\u0027 occurring in this first proviso is read in a manner in which the appellant wants us to read would tantamount to render a part of the expression otiose. We add that this first proviso to section 7 of CCA is relatable to only one of 20 + 1 = 21 categories of commercial disputes adumbrated in section 2(1)(c) of CCA and that one category is clause (xvii). Therefore, the objective of CCA is very clear as day light and the objective is to take out clause (xvii) {in as far as the High Courts which have ordinary Original Civil jurisdiction} from Commercial Courts and vest in the Commercial Divisions.", "Court-fees Act, 1870": "(3)in any suit or other proceedings so transferred, the Court-fees Act, 1870 (Central Act VII of 1870) shall apply, credit being given for any fees levied in the High Court.", "Trade Marks Act, 1940": "P.M.Swamy case (snuff) arose under the Trade Marks Act, 1940 [\u0027TM Act 1940\u0027 for the sake of convenience]. In this Act which is a predecessor Act [predecessor qua the Trade and Merchandise Marks Act, 1958], Section 73 of TM Act 1940 is akin to section 134(1) of TM Act 1999 that is now in vogue. Relevant portion of Section 73 of TM Act 1940 of the erstwhile statute reads as follows: \u002773.No suit for the infringement of a trade mark or otherwise relating to any right in a trade mark shall be instituted in any Court inferior to a District Court having jurisdiction to try the suit.\u0027 In P.M.Swamy case, when a decree in trade mark suit was passed by a City Civil Court (not the High Court) was assailed to be nullity in execution proceedings, this Court by tersely eloquent judgment sustained the nullity plea and reasoning is predicated on Section 73 of TM Act 1940.", "Trade Marks Act, 1999": "Section 73 of TM Act 1940 is akin to section 134(1) of TM Act 1999 that is now in vogue. The appellant\u2019s contention involved whether, under current law, a suit for infringement could lie in a lower court. However, practices and rulings indicated that infringement suits under the 1999 legislation would similarly be filed before higher fora, in line with the Original Side\u2019s jurisdiction.", "Trade and Merchandise Marks Act, 1958": "In this Act which is a predecessor Act [predecessor qua the Trade and Merchandise Marks Act, 1958], Section 73 of TM Act 1940 is akin to section 134(1) of TM Act 1999 that is now in vogue. The 1958 Act succeeded the 1940 Act but retained the principle that suits for infringement of a trade mark should not be instituted in courts below the District Court." } }, "chunk_9": { "analysis_of_arguments": "The appellant contended that the Commercial Court could hear the dispute as it fell under its purview, while the respondents argued that IP-related suits, particularly those previously under the IPAB regime, should be handled by the High Court\u2019s Commercial Division. They relied on the IP Division rules, the Commercial Courts Act\u2019s objective to expedite IP litigation, and the recent abolition of the IPAB to underscore that such matters rightly belong before the High Court.", "cases_referred": [ "SCG Contracts principle (2019) 12 SCC 210" ], "facts": "The appellant filed a suit involving intellectual property rights before a Commercial Court, which concluded that it lacked jurisdiction under the first proviso to Section 7 of the Commercial Courts Act, holding that the case should lie in the Commercial Division of the High Court. This order was challenged via C.M.A. No.2335 of 2024. Earlier, the erstwhile Intellectual Property Appellate Board ceased functioning under the Tribunals Reforms Act, 2021, prompting the High Court to establish an IP Division. The matter proceeded to an appellate stage before the High Court, which examined whether the Commercial Court\u2019s order was correct.", "final_status": "The appeal was dismissed.", "formatted_summary": "This section addresses an appeal (C.M.A. No.2335 of 2024) concerning whether an intellectual property-related suit rightly falls under the jurisdiction of a Commercial Court or the High Court\u2019s Commercial Division. The Commercial Court held it did not have jurisdiction, referencing the first proviso to Section 7 of the Commercial Courts Act, and directed that the suit should lie before the High Court\u2019s specialized IP Division. The High Court, noting recent changes such as the abolition of the IPAB under the Tribunals Reforms Act, 2021 and the introduction of IPD Rules, upheld the Commercial Court\u2019s conclusion, thereby reaffirming that IP matters under clause (xvii) properly belong before the Commercial Division.", "held": "The High Court affirmed that the Commercial Court\u2019s view was correct, holding that suits concerning intellectual property rights lie before the Commercial Division. The ruling clarifies the exclusive jurisdiction of the High Court\u2019s specialized IP Division and reiterates the statutory objective of efficient and expedited adjudication of commercial disputes, including IP matters.", "latin_principles": {}, "legal_issues": "Whether the suit involving intellectual property rights was within the jurisdiction of the Commercial Court or exclusively triable by the High Court\u2019s Commercial Division, in light of clause (xvii) of Section 2(1)(c) and the first proviso to Section 7 of the Commercial Courts Act.", "statutes": { "Commercial Courts Act (CCA)": "C.M.A. No.2335 of 2024\ndisputes adumbrated in section 2(1)(c) of CCA and that one \ncategory is clause (xvii). Therefore, the objective of CCA is very \nclear as day light and the objective is to take out clause (xvii) {in \nasfar as the High Courts which have oridinary Original Civil \njurisdiction} from Commercial Courts and vest in the \nCommercial Divisions. Therefore, we are unable to pesuade \nourselves to believe that said Commercial Court has fallen in \nerror in intrpreting the first proviso to section 7 of CCA and \narriving at a sequittur that the suit it was grappling with will lie \nonly in the Commercial Division of this court and not before it.\n\nA careful perusal of the scheme of the statute, i.e., CCA \nmakes it clear that when Section 6 deals with the jurisdiction of \nthe Commercial Court, Section 7 deals with the jurisdiction of \nCommercial Divisions. When we first talk about Commercial \nDivisions, we talk about 5 out of 25 High Courts in the Country, \ni.e., Madras, Bombay, Calcutta [Chartered High Courts], Delhi \nand Himachal Pradesh which have Original Side traceable to a \nstatute. Therefore, law makers were clear that Section 7 pertains \nto only 5 High Courts. In this view of the matter also, the \ndeference to statute as well as hierarchy of Courts shown by the \nsaid Commercial Court is in order and there is no ground calling \nfor interference.\n\nAs a corollary to the previous point, we find that there are \nno provision in Section 6 as regars to second proviso to section \n7. It is more than obvious that it has no place in Section 6 as \nsection 6 deals with jurisdiction of Commercial Courts and not \nCommercial Divisions (first proviso to section 7 of CCA which \nwe are concerned with). It could have well been possible to put \nin similar proviso in section 6 also. That there is no similar \nproviso in Section 6 means that IPR suit which is valued less \nthan Rs.3 lakhs (which is not uncommon at all), as there is \nprovision for notional valuation for injunctive reliefs which is \nrecognised by section 12 read with section 2(1)(i) of CCA. \nThose of the suits which are valued less than Rs.3 Lakhs will \nhave to be heard by the regular court and not Commercial Court. \nThis means that in such a suit which constitutes a sizeable \nchunk of Section 2(1)(c)(xvii), litigation will not be governed by \nthe timeline under CCA. As an illustration in such a IPR suit, \ndefendant can file written statement well after 30 days + 90 \ndays, i.e., 120 days, give a goby to SCG Contracts principle \nreported in (2019) 12 SCC 210 and seek condonation of delay \nand this will apply to all other timelines under CCA. If IPR \nlitigations are to be delayed enlessly by resorting to this, it \nwould run counter productive to the very objective of CCA. \nWhether there should be a proviso to section 6 akin to the first \nproviso to section 7 is a larger question which in our considered \nopinion may be outside our remit, i.e., outside the legal \nperimeter within which the legal drill on hand should \nperumbulate.", "The Madras High Court Intellectual Property Rights Division Rules, 2022": "In this regard, adding to the dispositive reasoning supra, \nthe Madras High Court has a IP Division which deals with IPR \nmatters and more particularly those of the matters which would \nhave otherwise gone before the erstwhile IPAB which, now, does \nnot exist owing to the Tribunals Reforms Act, 2021, which \nkicked in on 04.04.2021. \u0027The Madras High Court Intellectual \nProperty Rights Division Rules, 2022\u0027 [\u0027IPD Rules\u0027 for the sake \nof convenience] have been made to regulate proceedings of IP \nDivision and this set of Rules is operating. This is another \nbuttressing reason (on a demurrer) to say that all IPR matters \nshould go before the Commercial Division of the High Court \nrather than the said Commercial Court. On a larger perspective, \ni.e., on larger canvass, as regards other districts in State of Tamil \nNadu (other than Chennai/Madras), if a litigant seeks \nrectification of a trade mark, unlike the IPAB regime, i.e., the \nregime which existed prior to 04.04.2021, the litigant would \nnow have filed it in the IP Division of Madras High Court. If \nthere is a infringement suit in the same case (at least in Madras), \nthe rectification application has to be tagged with the \ninfringement suit and tried as cross suit as per IPD Rules of this \nCourt. This provision has been made to eliminate anomalies and \npossible conflict of decisions besides eliminating protraction of \nlitigation. Therefore, the impugned order is correct in referring \nto IPD Rules. The said Commercial Court has rightly referred to \nIPD Rules and has come to the conclusion that IPD Rules also \nbuttress the view that has been taken by said Commecial Court \nin the impugned order.", "Tribunals Reforms Act, 2021": "In this regard, adding to the dispositive reasoning supra, \nthe Madras High Court has a IP Division which deals with IPR \nmatters and more particularly those of the matters which would \nhave otherwise gone before the erstwhile IPAB which, now, does \nnot exist owing to the Tribunals Reforms Act, 2021, which \nkicked in on 04.04.2021. \u0027The Madras High Court Intellectual \nProperty Rights Division Rules, 2022\u0027 [\u0027IPD Rules\u0027 for the sake \nof convenience] have been made to regulate proceedings of IP \nDivision and this set of Rules is operating. This is another \nbuttressing reason (on a demurrer) to say that all IPR matters \nshould go before the Commercial Division of the High Court \nrather than the said Commercial Court.", "the Constitution": "(d)Said Commercial Court in the impuned order has \nrelied heavily on notifications / rules made by this Court for I.P. \nDivision, besides the practice note and notifications qua \nCommecial Division and Commercial Courts. These are either \ninstructions for administrative side or rules made by this Court \nin execise of its rule making power to regulate the proceedings \nbefore it. Said Commercial Court as it stands in the hierarchy of \nCourts cannot be faulted for having relied on such practice note \nand instructions and rules made by this Court as constitutionally \nspeaking it is a subordinate Court qua Chapter VI of Part VI of \nthe Constitution, i.e., subordinate Court qua High Court. This \ncourt has always leaned towards the expression \u0027district \njudiciary\u0027 or \u0027trial court\u0027 in preference to subordinate court but in \ndeference to the Constitutional language and as the context \ndemands, we have referred to the caption (Chaper VI) as \noccurring in the Constitution." } } }, "counsels": [ "Mr. Aryama Sundaram, Sr. Counsel (for Appellant)", "Mr. Krishna Srinivasan, Sr. Counsel (for Appellant)", "Ms. Geethi Ara (for Appellant)", "Ms. Rohini Musa (for Appellant)", "Mr. Karthick Ram Mohan (for Appellant)", "Mr. Hemanth Ragu (for Appellant)", "Ms. Nithyashree (for Appellant)", "Ms. Nirupam Lodha (for Appellant)", "Ms. Shivangi Narang (for Appellant)", "Mr. R. Parthasarathy, Sr. Counsel (for Respondent)", "Mr. Suhrith Parthasarathy (for Respondent)", "Ms. Shreya Gupta (for Respondent)", "Mr. Abhijeeth Sadikala (for Respondent)", "Mr. Allwin Godwin (for Respondent)", "Ms. Akhila Jayaraj (for Respondent)" ], "delivered_date": "27.08.2024", "facts": "Tractors \u0026 Farm Equipment Limited (TAFE) filed a trademark-related suit against Massey Ferguson Corp. (MFC) in the Principal Commercial Court at Egmore, Chennai, seeking declarations and injunctive relief. On 16.08.2024, the Commercial Court returned the plaint under Order VII Rule 10 of the Code of Civil Procedure, indicating it should be filed in the Commercial Division of the High Court. Aggrieved, TAFE preferred C.M.A. No.2335 of 2024, asserting the Commercial Court\u2019s competence. The dispute centers on whether intellectual property claims, particularly under clause (xvii) of Section 2(1)(c) of the Commercial Courts Act, must be brought before the High Court\u2019s Commercial Division due to specified value thresholds and statutory directives. The matter also invoked Section 12A of the Commercial Courts Act, the abolition of the IPAB, and the establishment of the IP Division within the High Court, prompting questions on forum selection, valuation for injunctive relief, and prevention of forum shopping. The appeal proceeded before the Commercial Appellate Division, which examined the appropriateness of returning the plaint for filing in the High Court\u2019s Commercial Division.", "final_status": "The appeal is dismissed.", "first_party": [ "1. Tractors \u0026 Farm Equipment Limited, No.77, Nungambakkam High Road, Chennai 600034, rep. by its Authorised Signatory C.P. Sounderarajan" ], "grouped_statutes": { "Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996": [ "\u201cIf such arbitration is other than an international commercial arbitration, all applications or appeals arising out of such arbitration under the provisions of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (26 of 1996) that would ordinarily lie before any Principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction in a district (not being a High Court) shall be filed in, and heard and disposed of by the Commercial Court exercising territorial jurisdiction...\u201d" ], "Chennai City Civil Court Act, 1892": [ "\u201cThe Chennai City Civil Court Act, 1892 [hereinafter \u0027CCC Act\u0027 for the sake of convenience] is of relevance, Section 16 of CCC Act clearly says the power of High Court and the same reads as follows: \u002716.Saving of original civil jurisdiction of High Court.-- Nothing in this Act contained shall affect the original civil jurisdiction of the High Court: Provided that -- (1)if any suit or other proceedings is instituted in the High Court which, in the opinion of the Judge who tries the same (whose opinion shall be final), ought to have been instituted in the City Court, no costs shall be allowed to a successful plaintiff... (2)in any suit or other proceedings pending at any time in the High Court and Judge of such Court may at any stage thereof make an order transferring the same to the City Court... (3)in any suit or other proceedings so transferred, the Court-fees Act, 1870 (Central Act VII of 1870) shall apply...\u0027\u201d" ], "Code of Civil Procedure, 1908": [ "\u201c2.To be noted, above referred \u0027Principal Commercial Court at Egmore, Chennai,\u0027 shall hereinafter be referred to as \u0027said Commercial Court\u0027 and above referred 16.08.2024 order, wherein and whereby a plaint was returned, inter alia by taking recourse to Order VII Rule 10 of \u0027the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908\u0027 (hereinafter referred to as \u0027CPC\u0027 for the sake of brevity, clarity and convenience) shall hereinafter be referred to as \u0027impugned order\u0027 for the sake of convenience and clarity.\u201d", "\u201c7.This CAD is of the view that it is not necessary to dilate more on facts qua averments in the plaint, considering the limited legal perimeter within which legal drill at hand in captioned CAD appeal should perambulate. In other words or to put it differently, this CAD is now concerned with the question as to \u0027whether the impugned order made by said Commercial Court returning the plaint by taking recourse to Order VII Rule 10 of CPC is correct?\u0027 and the more pointed question as to \u0027whether the plaint ought to have been presented only in the Commercial Division and not in the Commercial Court, much less said Commercial Court?\u0027 is the short point that arises for consideration. Therefore, as observed supra, it is unnecessary to dilate on the plaint averments as regards facts any further.\n\n13.1.It was argued by learned Senior Counsel for appellant that said Commercial Court ought not to have looked at CPC. This submission was made in the light of reference to Section 2(4) of CPC (definition of \u0027district\u0027 in the impugned order) by said Commecial court in the impugned order. To be noted, there is also a reference to \u0027District Court\u0027 within paranthesis in the definition of \u0027district\u0027 vide Section 2(4) of CPC. In this regard, to buttress this submission, it was submitted that CCA is (i) a special Act, (ii) a self-contained Code and (iii) it excludes all other statutes and Codes which run into it (Section 21 which deals with overriding effect of CCA). Interestingly, it was also submitted that CCA is partly substantive and partly procedural. We leave open the question as to whether CCA is partly substantive/partly procedural law or wholly procedural law as that is really not imperative to be part of dispositive reasoning for returning a verdict in the legal drill at hand.\nIn this regard, learned Senior Counsel for MFC drew our attention to sub section (2) of Section 2 of CCA. A careful perusal of the scheme of the statute, i.e., scheme of CCA, definition clause, sub section (2) of Section 2, makes it clear in categoric terms that the words and expressions used but not defined in CCA shall have the same meaning as assigned to them in CPC if the same are defined in CPC. We also looked at sub section (3) of Section 16. We make it clear that Section 16 read with Schedule is the soul of CCA and a careful perusal of CCA which talks about amendments to CPC in its applicability to commercial disputes makes it clear that when any rule of the jurisdictional High Court or any amendment to CPC by the State Government is in conflict with the provisions of CPC as amended by CCA, the provisions of CPC, as amended by CCA, will prevail. The scheme of the statue makes it clear that when it comes to commercial disputes and a trial in a Commercial Court, CPC, as amended by CCA will apply as regards those provisions of CPC which are amended by CCA. It is axiomatic and the inevitable corollary is, those of the provisions of CPC which have not been amended by CCA will\u201d", "\u201cCPC consists of 158 Sections, LI Orders vide Schedule I to CPC (in terms of 1 to 158 and Order I to Order LI but the actual number of Sections may be more/less, taking into account the alpha series in certain Sections besides insertions and deletions) and 8 Appendices to Schedule I, viz., A to H. The CCA, vide Section 16 and Schedule thereto, which we have described as the soul of CCA, amends three of the 158 Sections, 10 of the LI Orders and adds one Appendix, viz., Appendix I to the existing 8 Appendices, viz., Appendices A to H.\u201d", "\u201cThis CAD, as would be evident from the discussion, has come to the conclusion that all provisions of CPC which are not amended by CCA will apply in full force to a Commercial Court. We buttress this reasoning by pointing out that three [Order XIII Rule 1, Order VII Rule 14 and Order VIII Rule 1-A] provisions of CPC have been made inapplicable to Commercial Courts vide Schedule to CCA which has to be read with Section 16 of CCA. A careful perusal of these provisions which have been made inapplicable will make it clear that these provisions are such that they are either in an overlap or conflict with unamended provisions of CPC or do not fit into the CCA timelines. This CAD having buttressed this dispositive reasoning, has no hesitation in writing that said Commercial Court cannot be found fault with for having relied on Section 2(4) of CPC or for that matter other provisions of unamended CPC.\u201d", "\u201csaying that said Commercial Court was correct in its approach in returning the plaint (by referring to Order VII Rule 10 of CPC for being presented in the Commercial Division of this Court).\u201d" ], "Commercial Courts Act, 2015": [ "\u201cCivil Miscellaneneous Appeal filed under Section 13 of the Commercial Courts Act, 2015 read with Order XLIII Rule 1(A) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, challenging the order dated 16.08.2024 passed by the Principal Commercial Court, Egmore, Chennai in C.O.S.Sr.No.464 of 2024.\u201d", "\u201c11. We find that an application for dispensing with Section 12A of CCA has been filed but as that would be outside the perimeter within which the legal drill at hand should perambulate, we leave that question open but we make it clear that we shall consider that question in another matter where it becomes imperative to return a verdict.\n\n13.1.It was argued by learned Senior Counsel for appellant that said Commercial Court ought not to have looked at CPC. This submission was made in the light of reference to Section 2(4) of CPC (definition of \u0027district\u0027 in the impugned order) by said Commecial court in the impugned order. To be noted, there is also a reference to \u0027District Court\u0027 within paranthesis in the definition of \u0027district\u0027 vide Section 2(4) of CPC. In this regard, to buttress this submission, it was submitted that CCA is (i) a special Act, (ii) a self-contained Code and (iii) it excludes all other statutes and Codes which run into it (Section 21 which deals with overriding effect of CCA). Interestingly, it was also submitted that CCA is partly substantive and partly procedural. We leave open the question as to whether CCA is partly substantive/partly procedural law or wholly procedural law as that is really not imperative to be part of dispositive reasoning for returning a verdict in the legal drill at hand.\nIn this regard, learned Senior Counsel for MFC drew our attention to sub section (2) of Section 2 of CCA. A careful perusal of the scheme of the statute, i.e., scheme of CCA, definition clause, sub section (2) of Section 2, makes it clear in categoric terms that the words and expressions used but not defined in CCA shall have the same meaning as assigned to them in CPC if the same are defined in CPC. We also looked at sub section (3) of Section 16. We make it clear that Section 16 read with Schedule is the soul of CCA and a careful perusal of CCA which talks about amendments to CPC in its applicability to commercial disputes makes it clear that when any rule of the jurisdictional High Court or any amendment to CPC by the State Government is in conflict with the provisions of CPC as amended by CCA, the provisions of CPC, as amended by CCA, will prevail. The scheme of the statue makes it clear that when it comes to commercial disputes and a trial in a Commercial Court, CPC, as amended by CCA will apply as regards those provisions of CPC which are amended by CCA. It is axiomatic and the inevitable corollary is, those of the provisions of CPC which have not been amended by CCA will\u201d", "\u201cIn this regard, learned Senior Counsel for MFC drew our attention to sub section (2) of Section 2 of CCA. A careful perusal of the scheme of the statute, i.e., scheme of CCA, definition clause, sub section (2) of Section 2, makes it clear in categoric terms that the words and expressions used but not defined in CCA shall have the same meaning as assigned to them in CPC if the same are defined in CPC. We also looked at sub section (3) of Section 16. We make it clear that Section 16 read with Schedule is the soul of CCA\u201d", "\u201c\u201cjurisdiction qua commercial disputes vide Section 2(1)(c)(xvii) of CCA but are segregated by pecuniary jurisdiction. In other words or to put it in simple terms, the argument is, those of IPR suits vide Section 2(1)(c)(xvii) of CCA where a plaint is valued Rs.1 crore or less would go to the Commercial Court and those valued at Rs.1 crore or more would only come to the Commercial Division {to be noted, the pecuniary jurisdiction of Original Side of Madras High Court is above Rs.1 Crore}.\u201d\u201d", "\u201c\u201c13.3 This takes us to another facet of the appellant\u2019s campaign against the impugned order, i.e., the third point. This facet turns on the first proviso to Section 7 of CCA. Before proceeding further, we deem it appropriate to extract and reproduce Section 7 of CCA along with two provisos, which read as follows: \u00277.Jurisdiction of Commercial Divisions of High Courts.-- All suits and applications relating to commercial disputes of a Specific Value filed in a High Court having ordinary original civil jurisdiction shall be heard and disposed of by the Commercial Division of that High Court: Provided that all suits and applications relating to commercial disputes, stipulated by an Act to lie in a Court not inferior to a District Court, and filed or pending on the original side of the High Court, shall be heard and disposed of by the Commercial Division of the High Court...\u0027\u201d\u201d", "\u201c\u201cSection 10 deals with jurisdiction in respect of arbitration matters and sub section (3) thereat reads as follows: \u002710Jurisdiction in respect of arbitration matters.-- Where the subject matter of an arbitration is a commercial dispute of a specified value and -- (3)If such arbitration is other than an international commercial arbitration, all applications or appeals arising out of such arbitration under the provisions of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (26 of 1996) that would ordinarily lie before any Principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction in a district (not being a High Court) shall be filed in, and heard and disposed of by the Commercial Court exercising territorial jurisdiction...\u0027\u201d\u201d", "\u201c\u201cThis means that this takes this discussion to an arena where we notice that there is no similar proviso to Section 6 of CCA. There are no provisos at all to Section 6. The sequitur is, as regards Section 6 captioned \u2018Jurisdiction of Commercial Court\u2019, only those matters which satisfy the twin conditions of being a \u2018commercial dispute\u2019 under Section 2(1)(c), i.e., one of the 21 categories and of \u2018Specified Value\u2019 vide Section 2(1)(i) read with Section 12 of CCA, will qualify to be heard by Commercial Court, whereas, in the light of language in which the first proviso to Section 7 is couched, even those of the matters which are commercial disputes but not of Specified Value will qualify, provided a statute stipulates or makes it clear that the suit will lie in a Court which is not inferior to a District Court.\u201d\u201d", "\u201cWith regard to the second point argued on the appellant\u0027s side that the Commercial Courts and the Commercial Division are segregated only by pecuniary value, we are of the view that dispositive reasoning qua the first proviso to Section 7 makes the position clear that one out of 21 categories adumbrated under Section 2(1)(c) of CCA, only one clause [clause (xvii)] has been carved out for being heard exclusively by Commercial Division {irrespetive of specified value} (in five High Courts) and therefore, the argument that the jurisdictions of Commercial Courts and Commercial Division are segregated by pecuniary jurisdiction does not hold water when it comes to Section 2(1)(c)(xvii) of CCA, i.e., IPR suits.\u201d", "\u201cWe also find that in first proviso to Section 7 of CCA, the words used are \u0027file\u0027 and \u0027lie\u0027. We carefully perused P. Ramanatha Aiyar\u0027s Law Lexicon on the said two words. The word \u0027file\u0027 means \u0027to deposit with the proper custodian for keeping; to place in the official custody of the clerk; to put upon the files or among the records of a Court.\u0027 The word \u0027lie\u0027 means \u0027to subsist; to exist;\u0027 To be noted, these two meanings are the most relevant. Therefore, the expressions \u0027file\u0027 and \u0027lie\u0027 qua a suit necessarily pertain to \u0027presentation of a plaint\u0027 vide Rule 21 of Civil Rules of Practice which is prior to institution of suits.\u201d", "\u201c(c)We have set out in detail the scope of the first proviso to Section 7 of CCA. The said Commercial Court has also hinged the impugned judgment strongly (not solely) on this first proviso to section 7 of CCA. In addition to our dispositive reasoning supra that this first proviso to section 7 of CCA would apply to fresh cases to be filed and not to the pending cases, we add that the expression \u0027filed or pending\u0027 occurring in this first proviso is read in a manner in which the appellant wants us to read would tantamount to render a part of the expression otiose. We add that this first proviso to section 7 of CCA is relatable to only one of 20 + 1 = 21 categories of commercial disputes adumbrated in section 2(1)(c) of CCA and that one category is clause (xvii). Therefore, the objective of CCA is very clear as day light and the objective is to take out clause (xvii) {in as far as the High Courts which have ordinary Original Civil jurisdiction} from Commercial Courts and vest in the Commercial Divisions.\u201d", "\u201cthe timeline under CCA. As an illustration in such a IPR suit, defendant can file written statement well after 30 days + 90 days, i.e., 120 days, give a goby to SCG Contracts principle reported in (2019) 12 SCC 210 and seek condonation of delay and this will apply to all other timelines under CCA. If IPR litigations are to be delayed enlessly by resorting to this, it would run counter productive to the very objective of CCA. Whether there should be a proviso to section 6 akin to the first proviso to section 7 is a larger question which in our considered opinion may be outside our remit, i.e., outside the legal perimeter within which the legal drill on hand should perumbulate. Therefore, we are not treading into that arena and we are leaving that question open. Suffice to say that as regards the case on hand and the Madras High Court (rest of Tamil Nadu), as there is no proviso to section 6 which is akin to the first proviso to section 7 would lead to a situation where a sizeable chunk of IPR litigations go before the regular court and not the Commercial Court. This will be a anethema to the sublime philosophy underlining CCA and salutary principle guiding CCA. Therefore, we have no hesitation whatsoever in 37/41 https://www.mhc.tn.gov.in/judis C.M.A. No.2335 of 2024 saying that said Commercial Court was correct in its approach in returning the plaint (by referring to Order VII Rule 10 of CPC for being presented in the Commercial Division of this Court).\u201d", "\u201c(f) Lastly, we find that no prejudice has been caused to the appellant by the impugned order as the appellant can proceed with the same suit in the Commercial Division (subject of course Section 12-A point which may come up for consideration, which in any event would fall for consideration in Commercial Court also).\u201d" ], "Constitution of India": [ "\u201cWe carefully perused the definition of the expression \u0027District Judge\u0027 vide Section 2(1)(e) of CCA. We find that the definition of Section 2(1)(e) runs as follows: \u00272Definitions: (1) In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires, -- (a).... (b).... (c).... (d)..... (e)\u201cDistrict Judge\u201d shall have the same meaning as assigned to it in clause (a) of Article 236 of the Constitution of India;\u0027 Article 236(a) is neatly slotted in Chapter VI of Part VI of the Constitution. Part VI is captioned \u0027the States\u0027 and Chapter VI thereat is captioned \u0027Subordinate Courts\u0027. Article 236(a) refers to District Judge in that\u201d", "\u201c(d)Said Commercial Court in the impuned order has relied heavily on notifications / rules made by this Court for I.P. Division, besides the practice note and notifications qua Commecial Division and Commercial Courts. These are either instructions for administrative side or rules made by this Court in execise of its rule making power to regulate the proceedings before it. Said Commercial Court as it stands in the hierarchy of Courts cannot be faulted for having relied on such practice note and instructions and rules made by this Court as constitutionally speaking it is a subordinate Court qua Chapter VI of Part VI of the Constitution, i.e., subordinate Court qua High Court. This court has always leaned towards the expression \u0027district judiciary\u0027 or \u0027trial court\u0027 in preference to subordinate court but in deference to the Constitutional language and as the context demands, we have referred to the caption (Chaper VI) as occurring in the Constitution.\u201d" ], "Court-fees Act, 1870": [ "\u201c(3)in any suit or other proceedings so transferred, the Court-fees Act, 1870 (Central Act VII of 1870) shall apply, credit being given for any fees levied in the High Court.\u201d" ], "Designs Act, 2000": [ "\u201cProvided further that all suits and applications transferred to the High Court by virtue of sub-section (4) of Section 22 of the Designs Act, 2000 (16 of 2000) ... shall be heard and disposed of by the Commercial Division of the High Court in all the areas over which the High Court exercises ordinary original civil jurisdiction.\u201d", "\u201cIn this regard, we make it clear that all the legislations or Acts which fall under the basket of Intellectual Property Rights, viz., the Trademarks Act, 1999, the Copyright Act, 1957, the Designs Act, 2000, the Patents Act, 1970, the Geographical Indications of Goods (Registration and Protection) Act, 1999 and the Protection of Plant Variety and Farmers\u2019 Rights Act, 2001, have a provision which says that suit will not lie to a Court inferior to that of a District Court. \u2026 4 The Designs Act, 2000 S.22 \u2026\u201d" ], "Land Acquisition Act": [ "\u201cIn this regard, we find that Super Cassettes is clearly distinguishable on facts and we remind ourselves of the declaration of law made in Padma Sundara Rao (dead) and others vs. State of Tamil Nadu and others [(2002) 3 SCC 533] in which the factual matrix was the question as to whether on a Section 4 notice under the Land Acquisition Act being quashed, the State gets a fresh period of time to make the Section 6 declaration. Hon\u0027ble Supreme Court wrote that every precedent / case law has to be relied based on the facts obtaining therein ...\u201d" ], "Patents Act, 1970": [ "\u201cProvided further that all suits and applications transferred to the High Court by virtue of ... Section 104 of the Patents Act, 1970 (39 of 1970) shall be heard and disposed of by the Commercial Division of the High Court in all the areas over which the High Court exercises ordinary original civil jurisdiction.\u201d", "\u201cIn this regard, we make it clear that all the legislations or Acts which fall under the basket of Intellectual Property Rights, viz., the Trademarks Act, 1999, the Copyright Act, 1957, the Designs Act, 2000, the Patents Act, 1970, the Geographical Indications of Goods (Registration and Protection) Act, 1999 and the Protection of Plant Variety and Farmers\u2019 Rights Act, 2001, have a provision which says that suit will not lie to a Court inferior to that of a District Court. \u2026 2 The Patents Act, 1970 S.104 \u2026\u201d" ], "The Copyright Act, 1957": [ "\u201cIn this regard, we make it clear that all the legislations or Acts which fall under the basket of Intellectual Property Rights, viz., the Trademarks Act, 1999, the Copyright Act, 1957, the Designs Act, 2000, the Patents Act, 1970, the Geographical Indications of Goods (Registration and Protection) Act, 1999 and the Protection of Plant Variety and Farmers\u2019 Rights Act, 2001, have a provision which says that suit will not lie to a Court inferior to that of a District Court. \u2026 3 The Copyright Act, 1957 S.62 \u2026\u201d" ], "The Geographical Indications of Goods (Registration and Protection) Act, 1999": [ "\u201cIn this regard, we make it clear that all the legislations or Acts which fall under the basket of Intellectual Property Rights, viz., the Trademarks Act, 1999, the Copyright Act, 1957, the Designs Act, 2000, the Patents Act, 1970, the Geographical Indications of Goods (Registration and Protection) Act, 1999 and the Protection of Plant Variety and Farmers\u2019 Rights Act, 2001, have a provision which says that suit will not lie to a Court inferior to that of a District Court. \u2026 5 The Geographical Indications of Goods (Registration and Protection) Act, 1999 Ss.66 and 73 \u2026\u201d" ], "The Madras High Court Intellectual Property Rights Division Rules, 2022": [ "\u201cIn this regard, adding to the dispositive reasoning supra, the Madras High Court has a IP Division which deals with IPR matters and more particularly those of the matters which would have otherwise gone before the erstwhile IPAB which, now, does not exist owing to the Tribunals Reforms Act, 2021, which kicked in on 04.04.2021. \u0027The Madras High Court Intellectual Property Rights Division Rules, 2022\u0027 [\u0027IPD Rules\u0027 for the sake of convenience] have been made to regulate proceedings of IP Division and this set of Rules is operating. This is another buttressing reason (on a demurrer) to say that all IPR matters should go before the Commercial Division of the High Court rather than the said Commercial Court. On a larger perspective, i.e., on larger canvass, as regards other districts in State of Tamil Nadu (other than Chennai/Madras), if a litigant seeks rectification of a trade mark, unlike the IPAB regime, i.e., the regime which existed prior to 04.04.2021, the litigant would now have filed it in the IP Division of Madras High Court. If there is a infringement suit in the same case (at least in Madras), the rectification application has to be tagged with the infringement suit and tried as cross suit as per IPD Rules of this Court. This provision has been made to eliminate anomalies and possible conflict of decisions besides eliminating protraction of litigation. Therefore, the impugned order is correct in referring to IPD Rules. The said Commercial Court has rightly referred to IPD Rules and has come to the conclusion that IPD Rules also buttress the view that has been taken by said Commecial Court in the impugned order.\u201d" ], "The Protection of Plant Variety and Farmers\u0027 Rights Act, 2001": [ "\u201cIn this regard, we make it clear that all the legislations or Acts which fall under the basket of Intellectual Property Rights, viz., the Trademarks Act, 1999, the Copyright Act, 1957, the Designs Act, 2000, the Patents Act, 1970, the Geographical Indications of Goods (Registration and Protection) Act, 1999 and the Protection of Plant Variety and Farmers\u2019 Rights Act, 2001, have a provision which says that suit will not lie to a Court inferior to that of a District Court. \u2026 6 The Protection of Plant Variety and Farmers\u2019 Rights Act, 2001 S.65 \u2026\u201d" ], "The Trademarks Act, 1999": [ "\u201cIn this regard, we make it clear that all the legislations or Acts which fall under the basket of Intellectual Property Rights, viz., the Trademarks Act, 1999, the Copyright Act, 1957, the Designs Act, 2000, the Patents Act, 1970, the Geographical Indications of Goods (Registration and Protection) Act, 1999 and the Protection of Plant Variety and Farmers\u2019 Rights Act, 2001, have a provision which says that suit will not lie to a Court inferior to that of a District Court. For the sake of ease of reference, the provisions in these six enactments as per which a suit will not lie to a Court inferior to that of a District Court, are set out in the following tabular column: \u2026 1 The Trademarks Act, 1999 Ss. 134 and 142 \u2026\u201d", "\u201cthe High Court (Original Side) is not a District Court. A straightforward answer to this lies in the language in which Section 134(1) of \u0027the Trade Marks Act, 1999\u0027 [\u0027TM Act 1999\u0027 for the sake of convenience] is couched. Section 134(1) of TM Act 1999 makes it clear that a suit shall not be instituted in any Court inferior to a District Court having jurisdiction, meaning, as long as there is territorial jurisdiction, a Court which is not inferior i.e., below the District Court in the \u0027hierarchy of Courts\u0027 (cannotation) as we understand the expression \u0027inferior\u0027 cannot be approached. High Court (Original Side) is obviously above the District Court in the hierarchy of Courts and therefore, this does not present a problem.\u201d", "\u201cSection 73 of TM Act 1940 is akin to section 134(1) of TM Act 1999 that is now in vogue. The appellant\u2019s contention involved whether, under current law, a suit for infringement could lie in a lower court. However, practices and rulings indicated that infringement suits under the 1999 legislation would similarly be filed before higher fora, in line with the Original Side\u2019s jurisdiction.\u201d" ], "Trade Marks Act, 1940": [ "\u201cP.M.Swamy case (snuff) arose under the Trade Marks Act, 1940 [\u0027TM Act 1940\u0027 for the sake of convenience]. In this Act which is a predecessor Act [predecessor qua the Trade and Merchandise Marks Act, 1958], Section 73 of TM Act 1940 is akin to section 134(1) of TM Act 1999 that is now in vogue. Relevant portion of Section 73 of TM Act 1940 of the erstwhile statute reads as follows: \u002773.No suit for the infringement of a trade mark or otherwise relating to any right in a trade mark shall be instituted in any Court inferior to a District Court having jurisdiction to try the suit.\u0027 In P.M.Swamy case, when a decree in trade mark suit was passed by a City Civil Court (not the High Court) was assailed to be nullity in execution proceedings, this Court by tersely eloquent judgment sustained the nullity plea and reasoning is predicated on Section 73 of TM Act 1940.\u201d" ], "Trade and Merchandise Marks Act, 1958": [ "\u201cIn this Act which is a predecessor Act [predecessor qua the Trade and Merchandise Marks Act, 1958], Section 73 of TM Act 1940 is akin to section 134(1) of TM Act 1999 that is now in vogue. The 1958 Act succeeded the 1940 Act but retained the principle that suits for infringement of a trade mark should not be instituted in courts below the District Court.\u201d" ], "Tribunals Reforms Act, 2021": [ "\u201cIn this regard, adding to the dispositive reasoning supra, the Madras High Court has a IP Division which deals with IPR matters and more particularly those of the matters which would have otherwise gone before the erstwhile IPAB which, now, does not exist owing to the Tribunals Reforms Act, 2021, which kicked in on 04.04.2021. \u0027The Madras High Court Intellectual Property Rights Division Rules, 2022\u0027 [\u0027IPD Rules\u0027 for the sake of convenience] have been made to regulate proceedings of IP Division and this set of Rules is operating. This is another buttressing reason (on a demurrer) to say that all IPR matters should go before the Commercial Division of the High Court rather than the said Commercial Court.\u201d" ], "the Civil Rules of Practice": [ "\u201cTherefore, the expressions \u0027file\u0027 and \u0027lie\u0027 qua a suit necessarily pertain to \u0027presentation of a plaint\u0027 vide Rule 21 of Civil Rules of Practice which is prior to institution of suits.\u201d" ] }, "held": "The High Court upheld the return of the plaint, concluding that intellectual property suits under clause (xvii) of Section 2(1)(c) properly lie before the Commercial Division in High Courts having original jurisdiction. It affirmed that the Commercial Court\u2019s order contained no error and that the legislative objective of expedited adjudication for commercial and IPR disputes is facilitated by assigning such matters to the specialized forum. The decision clarifies that the appellant must file the returned plaint in the High Court\u2019s Commercial Division or IP Division, as applicable.", "latin_principles": { "ad valorem": "As regards injunctive reliefs, notional valuation is possible and similar suits can be presented in different forums by adjusting the valuation, which is neither ad valorem nor fixed.", "qua": "Paragraph 7: This CAD is of the view that it is not necessary to dilate more on facts qua averments in the plaint, considering the limited legal perimeter...", "vide": "Therefore, the expressions \u0027file\u0027 and \u0027lie\u0027 qua a suit necessarily pertain to \u0027presentation of a plaint\u0027 vide Rule 21 of Civil Rules of Practice..." }, "legal_issues": [ "Whether the Commercial Court had jurisdiction over the trademark and IP dispute or if the plaint should be filed in the High Court\u2019s Commercial Division", "whether the first proviso to Section 7 of the Commercial Courts Act mandates exclusive jurisdiction in such IP suits regardless of specified value", "whether strategic valuations for injunctive relief could result in forum shopping", "and whether Section 12A of the Commercial Courts Act or specialized IP Division rules affect the maintainability of the suit in the Commercial Court." ], "prayer": "Civil Miscellaneneous Appeal filed under Section 13 of the Commercial Courts Act, 2015 read with Order XLIII Rule 1(A) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, challenging the order dated 16.08.2024 passed by the Principal Commercial Court, Egmore, Chennai in C.O.S.Sr.No.464 of 2024.", "reserved_date": null, "second_party": [ "1. Massey Ferguson Corp., 4205 River Greenway Parkway, Duluth 30096, United States of America, rep. by its Authorised Signatory" ], "statutes": { "Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 (26 of 1996)": "Under Section 10(3) of the Commercial Courts Act, commercial arbitration matters that would ordinarily lie before the Principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction are assigned to the Commercial Court if constituted. High-value or international commercial arbitrations can be heard by the High Court, ensuring alignment of arbitration disputes with commercial jurisprudence.", "Chennai City Civil Court Act, 1892": "Section 16 confirms that nothing in this Act shall affect the High Court\u2019s original civil jurisdiction, enforcing that suits beyond certain thresholds or subject matters remain under the High Court. Provisos authorize the judge to transfer suits to the city civil court if appropriate, but IPR cases typically remain with the High Court where specialized benches exist.", "Code of Civil Procedure, 1908": "2.To be noted, above referred \u0027Principal Commercial Court at Egmore, Chennai,\u0027 shall hereinafter be referred to as \u0027said Commercial Court\u0027 and above referred 16.08.2024 order, wherein a plaint was returned under Order VII Rule 10 of \u0027the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908\u0027 (hereinafter \u0027CPC\u0027), shall hereinafter be referred to as \u0027impugned order.\u0027 The unamended provisions continue to govern many procedural elements unless specifically modified by the Commercial Courts Act. When a plaint is returned for lack of jurisdiction, it may be re-presented to the competent forum without losing the original date of institution.", "Commercial Courts Act, 2015": "Civil Miscellaneous Appeal filed under Section 13 of the Commercial Courts Act, 2015 read with Order XLIII Rule 1(A) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, challenging the order dated 16.08.2024 passed by the Principal Commercial Court, Egmore, Chennai in C.O.S.Sr.No.464 of 2024. The Act clarifies that words not defined therein shall have the same meaning as in the CPC, and Section 16 read with the Schedule prevails over conflicting High Court rules or CPC amendments. The first proviso to Section 7 assigns intellectual property disputes to the High Court\u2019s Commercial Division, reflecting the legislative intent to streamline high-value or specialized commercial litigation.", "Constitution of India": "Article 236(a), part of Chapter VI of Part VI, defines \u0027District Judge\u0027 within the hierarchy of Subordinate Courts. The High Court (Original Side) stands above the District Court in this hierarchy. Where intellectual property disputes must be filed at or above the District Court level, the High Court\u2019s Original Side is recognized as a superior forum. The Commercial Court, being constitutionally subordinate, cannot override statutory stipulations requiring certain suits to be instituted at a higher level of jurisdiction.", "Copyright Act, 1957": "Section 62 places copyright disputes within courts not inferior to a District Court, and the Commercial Courts Act extends that rule to the High Court\u2019s Commercial Division where original civil jurisdiction is exercised, thereby consolidating infringement, passing off, and other related copyright matters in a specialized tribunal for efficient resolution.", "Court-fees Act, 1870": "Referenced in Section 16(3) of the Chennai City Civil Court Act, 1892, the Court-fees Act applies to transferred suits, ensuring that fees already paid in the High Court are credited. This structure prevents litigants from double payment and reinforces administrative consistency during re-presentation or transfers of suits between forums.", "Designs Act, 2000 (16 of 2000)": "Suits and applications transferred under Section 22 of the Designs Act, 2000 must be heard and disposed of by the Commercial Division in High Courts authorized with original civil jurisdiction. The Commercial Courts Act references this in the second proviso to Section 7, ensuring uniform handling of design infringement or invalidity claims in specialized commercial benches.", "Land Acquisition Act": "Padma Sundara Rao (dead) and others vs. State of Tamil Nadu and others [(2002) 3 SCC 533] was a Supreme Court decision addressing time limits for declarations under Sections 4 and 6. While factually distinct from the trademark dispute, the ruling illustrates that each precedent depends on its context, cautioning against extending procedural conclusions from one domain to unrelated circumstances.", "Patents Act, 1970 (39 of 1970)": "Section 104 states that patent infringement suits shall not be instituted in any court inferior to a District Court. When read with the Commercial Courts Act, suits involving patents above the specified value or requiring specialized adjudication fall before the High Court\u2019s Commercial Division, solidifying a tiered forum structure for IP matters.", "The Geographical Indications of Goods (Registration and Protection) Act, 1999": "Sections 66 and 73 specify that infringement actions involving geographical indications shall not lie below the rank of a District Court. Consistent with the Commercial Courts Act, such disputes are commercial in nature and, if within the High Court\u2019s territorial and pecuniary jurisdiction, are placed before the Commercial Division under the first proviso to Section 7.", "The Madras High Court Intellectual Property Rights Division Rules, 2022": "These rules regulate cases formerly handled by the IPAB, centralizing them under the High Court\u2019s IP Division. They permit the consolidation of infringement and cancellation actions in a single forum, preventing conflicting outcomes and reducing delays. The Commercial Court correctly referenced these rules to conclude that IP disputes fall under the Commercial Division of the High Court in jurisdictions with established IP Divisions.", "The Protection of Plant Variety and Farmers\u0027 Rights Act, 2001": "Section 65 stipulates that infringement or related suits under this Act shall be filed in courts not lower than a District Court. For High Courts with original civil jurisdiction, these matters implicate the Commercial Division if classified as commercial disputes, ensuring comprehensive and efficient adjudication under the specialized scheme.", "The Trade Marks Act, 1940": "Section 73 prohibited filing an infringement suit in any court inferior to a District Court. This principle influenced subsequent trademark legislation, including the Trade and Merchandise Marks Act, 1958, and The Trade Marks Act, 1999. The consistent legislative objective is to reserve trademark disputes for higher forums, now realigned with the Commercial Division for IP matters.", "Trade and Merchandise Marks Act, 1958": "Like its predecessor, the 1958 Act continued the policy of requiring infringement suits to be tried by courts at or above District Court rank. Under the current regime, the Commercial Courts Act and subsequent High Court rules place such trademark controversies before specialized commercial forums in High Courts with ordinary original jurisdiction.", "Tribunals Reforms Act, 2021": "Following the abolition of the Intellectual Property Appellate Board under this legislation, certain IP matters, including trademark and patent disputes, transitioned to the High Court. The Act, enforced on 04.04.2021, reorganized tribunals, ensuring that specialized controversies, such as rectification proceedings, are heard before the High Court\u2019s IP Division.", "the Constitution": "Said Commercial Court referenced rules made by the High Court in exercise of its constitutional rule-making power. Under Part VI, Chapter VI of the Constitution, district courts and subordinate courts remain below the High Court in hierarchy. Hence, statutory instructions, practice notes, and specialized IP or commercial divisions form part of the High Court\u2019s supervisory authority over subordinate forums.", "the Trade Marks Act, 1999": "Section 134(1) provides that no suit for infringement shall be instituted in any court inferior to a District Court having jurisdiction. The High Court (Original Side) is deemed a higher forum than a District Court, consistent with prior trademark legislation. Thus, trademark infringement disputes often proceed in the Commercial Division where the High Court exercises original civil jurisdiction." }, "statutes_headnotes": { "Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996": "\u2014 Domestic Arbitration \u2014 Jurisdiction of Commercial Courts \u2014 Statutory Scheme \u2014 Appeals or applications arising from domestic arbitration ordinarily lie before the Principal Civil Court, but under the Commercial Courts Act, IP and other commercial disputes also fall under specialized forums in High Courts having original jurisdiction \u2014 In trademark suit filed by TAFE against MFC, Commercial Court returned plaint for want of jurisdiction, directing filing before High Court\u2019s Commercial Division under clause (xvii) of Section 2(1)(c) \u2014 High Court upheld return, emphasizing expedited resolution for commercial and IP disputes \u2014 Appellant must present plaint in Commercial or IP Division of the High Court, as legislatively intended.", "Chennai City Civil Court Act, 1892": "\u2014 Saving of original civil jurisdiction of High Court \u2014 Section 16 ensures CCC Act does not curtail High Court\u2019s original side \u2014 Improper institution in High Court, if suit ought to be in City Court, attracts no costs to plaintiff \u2014 High Court retains power to transfer pending suits to City Court \u2014 Court-fees Act, 1870 applies to transferred suits \u2014 In IP and commercial disputes, High Court\u2019s original jurisdiction remains unaffected, preserving specialized forums for adjudication.", "Civil Rules of Practice": "\u2014 Presentation of plaint \u2014 Return of suit \u2014 Under Rule 21, the expressions \u0027file\u0027 and \u0027lie\u0027 refer to the act of \u0027presentation of a plaint\u0027 occurring prior to formal institution of suits \u2014 In a trademark dispute, the Commercial Court returned the plaint to be filed before the High Court\u2019s Commercial Division, finding no error in the process \u2014 High Court upheld the return, clarifying that intellectual property suits under clause (xvii) of Section 2(1)(c) of the Commercial Courts Act must be presented to the specialized forum where the High Court has original civil jurisdiction, thus facilitating the legislative objective of swift adjudication of commercial and IP disputes.", "Code of Civil Procedure, 1908": "\u2014 Return of plaint \u2014 Intellectual Property (IP) dispute filed in Commercial Court \u2014 Clause (xvii) of Section 2(1)(c) of Commercial Courts Act \u2014 Order VII Rule 10 CPC invoked \u2014 Held, Commercial Court correctly returned the plaint for presentation before High Court\u2019s Commercial Division having original jurisdiction \u2014 Legislative scheme mandates specialized and expedited forum for IP suits \u2014 Unamended provisions of CPC remain applicable except where overridden by amendments in Commercial Courts Act \u2014 Appeal dismissed.", "Commercial Courts Act, 2015": "\u2014 Intellectual Property Dispute \u2014 Return of plaint to High Court\u2019s Commercial Division \u2014 Trademark suit filed in Commercial Court but returned under Order VII Rule 10 CPC \u2014 Clause (xvii) of Section 2(1)(c), read with first proviso to Section 7, mandates IP suits in High Courts with original civil jurisdiction \u2014 Commercial Court\u2019s order upheld \u2014 Expedient disposal of commercial and IPR matters \u2014 Appeal dismissed.", "Constitution of India": "\u2014 District Judge \u2014 Meaning assigned under Clause (a) of Article 236 \u2014 Section 2(1)(e) of Commercial Courts Act adopting the constitutional definition \u2014 Subordinate Courts under Chapter VI of Part VI \u2014 Commercial Court found subordinate to High Court \u2014 Intellectual property disputes under Clause (xvii) of Section 2(1)(c) must lie before Commercial Division in High Court having original jurisdiction \u2014 Return of plaint upheld to advance legislative intent of swift commercial and IPR adjudication.", "Court-fees Act, 1870": "\u2014 Credit for Fees upon Transfer \u2014 Under sub-section (3), in suits or proceedings transferred to the High Court, Court-fees Act, 1870 applies, with credit given for fees already levied in the High Court \u2014 In the present IPR dispute, the plaint returned by the Commercial Court for filing in the High Court\u2019s Commercial Division does not attract duplicated court fee \u2014 Legislative scheme ensures consistency in fee assessment and expedites resolution of IP and commercial matters.", "Designs Act, 2000": "\u2014 Suits and applications under Act \u2014 Commercial Division of High Court \u2014 Intellectual property claims, including designs under clause (xvii) of Section 2(1)(c) of Commercial Courts Act, must be filed in the High Court\u2019s Commercial Division if the High Court exercises original civil jurisdiction \u2014 Court upheld return of plaint under Order VII Rule 10 CPC \u2014 No error found in Commercial Court\u2019s order \u2014 Legislative intent for expedited IPR adjudication satisfied \u2014 Appeal dismissed.", "Land Acquisition Act": "\u2014 Quashing of Section 4 Notification \u2014 Whether fresh period for Section 6 Declaration arises \u2014 Padma Sundara Rao (Dead) \u0026 Ors. v. State of Tamil Nadu \u0026 Ors. (2002) 3 SCC 533 emphasized that precedents must be applied in the factual context \u2014 Mere quashing of Section 4 notification does not automatically grant a renewed timeline for Section 6 declaration \u2014 Super Cassettes case found distinguishable on facts.", "Patents Act, 1970": "\u2014 Suits and applications under Section 104 \u2014 Must be heard by the High Court\u2019s Commercial Division where the High Court exercises original civil jurisdiction \u2014 Lower forums lack jurisdiction in such patent and IP disputes \u2014 Legislative intent is expeditious and specialized adjudication of IPR matters \u2014 Return of plaint by Commercial Court, held, valid.", "The Copyright Act, 1957": "\u2014 Intellectual Property Rights \u2014 Jurisdiction \u2014 Suit not maintainable before a Court inferior to a District Court \u2014 Section 62 read with Commercial Courts Act, 2015 mandates IP disputes to be brought before the Commercial Division of High Court having original jurisdiction \u2014 Return of plaint from Principal Commercial Court upheld \u2014 Legislative intent for expeditious disposal of IPR disputes recognized \u2014 Appeal dismissed.", "The Geographical Indications of Goods (Registration and Protection) Act, 1999": "\u2014 Registration and Protection of GIs \u2014 Ss.66 \u0026 73 \u2014 No suit maintainable below District Court \u2014 All IPR statutes, including GI Act, confer jurisdiction on District Courts or higher \u2014 Commercial Division of High Court holds exclusive jurisdiction if original civil power is vested \u2014 Return of plaint for filing before Commercial Division upheld for swift, specialized IPR adjudication.", "The Madras High Court Intellectual Property Rights Division Rules, 2022": "\u2014 IP Division established in Madras High Court \u2014 Abolition of IPAB by Tribunals Reforms Act, 2021 led to IP jurisdiction shifting to High Court \u2014 IPD Rules, 2022 govern commercial IP suits \u2014 Ensures swift adjudication, avoids conflicting decisions, and prevents litigation delays \u2014 Return of plaint from Commercial Court for refiling in IP/Commercial Division upheld \u2014 Legislative intent of specialized IPR forum reaffirmed.", "The Protection of Plant Variety and Farmers\u0027 Rights Act, 2001": "\u2014 Jurisdiction \u2014 Section 65 \u2014 Suits not maintainable below District Court \u2014 Under Clause (xvii) of Section 2(1)(c) of the Commercial Courts Act, IP suits lie in High Court\u2019s Commercial Division if original jurisdiction is exercised \u2014 Return of plaint by Commercial Court upheld \u2014 Legislative objective of expedited IPR adjudication reinforced.", "The Trademarks Act, 1999": "\u2014 Jurisdiction of Courts \u2014 Sections 134 and 142 mandate that no suit shall lie in a Court inferior to that of a District Court \u2014 High Court (Original Side) stands above District Court in hierarchy \u2014 Clause (xvii) of Section 2(1)(c) of Commercial Courts Act ensures IP disputes are filed in the Commercial Division where the High Court has original jurisdiction \u2014 Return of plaint by the Commercial Court for re-filing in High Court\u2019s Commercial Division, upheld \u2014 Legislative aim of expeditious resolution of IPR disputes recognized \u2014 Appeal dismissed.", "Trade Marks Act, 1940": "\u2014 Jurisdiction in Trade Mark Suits \u2014 Section 73 akin to Section 134(1) of TM Act 1999 \u2014 Decree by City Civil Court nullified in P.M.Swamy case \u2014 Infringement suits cannot be filed before inferior Courts \u2014 TAFE v. MFC upheld return of plaint by Commercial Court for filing in High Court\u2019s Commercial Division, furthering swift adjudication of IPR disputes.", "Trade and Merchandise Marks Act, 1958": "\u2014 Infringement Suit \u2014 Jurisdiction of Commercial Court \u2014 Under Section 2(1)(c)(xvii) of Commercial Courts Act, IP suits lie in High Court\u2019s Commercial Division if High Court has original jurisdiction \u2014 Return of plaint under Order VII, Rule 10 CPC justified \u2014 Scheme ensures expedited adjudication and prevents forum shopping \u2014 Section 12A and IP Division framework affirm exclusive High Court forum \u2014 Appeal dismissed.", "Tribunals Reforms Act, 2021": "\u2014 Abolition of IPAB \u2014 Effective from 04.04.2021 dissolving IPAB \u2014 Madras High Court IP Division formed under IPD Rules, 2022 to handle IPR matters \u2014 Commercial Division in High Courts with original jurisdiction recognized as specialized forum \u2014 Legislative goal of swift and streamlined IPR adjudication upheld." } }, "summary": { "formatted_summary": "The dispute arose when a trademark suit filed by TAFE against MFC in the Commercial Court was returned for presentation to the High Court\u2019s Commercial Division. TAFE appealed the return order, arguing that the lower court was competent. The High Court held that, under the Commercial Courts Act, intellectual property cases covered by clause (xvii) of Section 2(1)(c) must be heard in the High Court\u2019s Commercial Division if the High Court has original civil jurisdiction. It dismissed the appeal, affirming the Commercial Court\u2019s return of the plaint and reinforcing the statutory scheme for swift resolution of IPR and other commercial disputes." } }